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Abstract

This study examines the criteria which help academics receive National Institute
of Health funds (NIH). The study covers 3,092 NIH recipients and non-recipients in the
same department or institute at twenty-four universities. The universities are drawn from
those below the top twenty in terms of receipt of NIH funds. With regards to
performance, non- recipients have lower performance than recipients. A key determinant
of the receipt of NIH funds is individual performance, as measured by the number of
articles published and average citations per article in the two years immediately prior to
the grant application. Professors receive more NIH money than do associates and
assistant professors. Other positive contributors are the field of study, whether the
academic has both a PhD. and Medical degree, and has licensed an innovation, been
involved in the start of a new business and patented an invention through the university.
To the extent that individual performance criteria represent the quality of the research
proposal, allocation of NIH funds is based on merit.

A Tobit model indicates that being highly cited does not guarantee increasing
returns. Likewise, career citations have only a small statistically significant impact. In
addition, a negative coefficient associated with the second derivatives of both articles
published in 2006–07 and their associated citations indicate diminishing marginal returns.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review

In the future, the buildings housing those who will create well-paying,
sustainable jobs, and provide the United States with a sustainable
competitive advantage in the global economy are not courthouses or
government offices but research labs, classrooms, and innovation centers
where big ideas are hatched and subsequently translated into reality.
(Thorp and Goldstein, 2010, Engines of Innovation: The Entrepreneurial
University In The Twenty-First Century, p. 2)
There are limits to how much of the total talent a few universities can
succeed in capturing. … But the distribution of talent in its most extreme
form is nevertheless sharply skewed. … The greatest discoveries are
made by a very small proportion of the population of professors at even
the best schools. If the wealthiest dominate the “acquisition” of this
group, they will in fact reduce the competitors to a farm system of
universities, whose function will increasingly be to prepare those who
demonstrate the greatest talent to move up to the “final eight” or the “final
four”. (Cole, 2009, The Great American University, p. 47)

Background
The statements reproduced above represent the promise and the dilemma
associated with American universities and colleges, which provide the wherewithal—
graduates and intellectual capital—needed to compete successfully in a global economy.
Though they are important institutions, needed for economic growth, their underlying
principle of academic excellence, which has evolved since World War II, has created a
number of challenges. First and foremost is the use of rankings to determine academic
excellence. This system, called climbing the Carnegie Ladder, places research
universities on the top rung of the ladder. Colleges and universities compete to reach the
top rung. The problem, as Cole expressed above, is that those at the top of the ladder,
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considered to be the elite, garner the largest amounts of research funds and alumni
contributions, which in turn attracts the most talented researchers: the stars. Thus the rich
get richer. This makes it difficult for lower-ranked universities and colleges to compete
effectively. A second challenge is the pressure associated with the expectations placed
on the academic entrepreneur. The academic entrepreneur, as initially defined, is
concerned with obtaining research grants and economic sponsorship from private and
government sources. Over the past few decades, this term has taken on a more businessoriented meaning, in that such academics are actually entrepreneurs who found
businesses, which happens particularly frequently in the field of biotechnology.
After World War II, university administrators made a conscious effort to make the
academic entrepreneur the “normative behavior” for university professors. This behavior
was encouraged through a reward system in which salaries and promotion were based on
the amount of outside grant money received (Lowen, 1997).
Since the academic system has been considered a meritocracy, academics who are
considered “stars” obtain a disproportionate amount of the rewards and acclaim, which is
known as the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968). Further, because of that acclaim, “star”
academics are the most sought-after by universities attempting to maintain or improve
their ranking relative to other universities. Consequently, they can demand premium
salaries and other benefits from current or suitor institutions. However, once hired,
exceptional performance is expected of them. The resulting pressure, critics such as
Rhode (2006) have argued, has led to too little attention given to teaching and too much
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given to producing research. While this criticism may be justified, the underlying
problem concerns the atmosphere and culture surrounding the academic entrepreneur:
In an ideal world, research priorities would be determined by what is most likely
to advance the pursuit of knowledge. In the world as we know it, the focus is
often on what is most attractive to government, foundation, corporate, or
individual funders. And when institutions or their faculty can take a cut of the
revenues through patents or partial ownership interests, or when sponsors insist on
secrecy or controls over publications to protect their investment, the corrosive
possibilities are still greater. Why should so much effort focus on basic research
when all the money is in developing no-snag panty hose? (Rhode, 2006: 20–21)
The purpose of this dissertation is not to address the validity of these criticisms.
Rather, this research will attempt to answer three questions at the heart of the existing
approach followed by university administrators. First, are there specific characteristics
that positively affect the receipt of federal research funds? Second, are there increasing
returns associated with attracting star academics to a university? Third, can lower-ranked
universities move up in the rankings, or do those who are considered elite have such a
cumulative advantage that it is almost impossible to reach the top tier?
As a foundation for addressing these three, primary research questions, I make
one assumption and put forward two propositions. The assumption is that university
officials and faculty researchers at universities, as well as policy makers, are rational
actors. The first proposition is that at the strategic level there are two economic models
at work. The second proposition is that university officials do not operate in a vacuum;
their decisions are shaped by the norms of the university.
I first consider two economic models. The first model, clearly expressed above
by Cole (2009), stresses the positive agglomeration effects and cumulative advantage
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early entrants obtain over time. The rich get richer and early entrants have an absolute
advantage that later entrants have a difficulty overcoming. his model primarily views the
university as one of many economic entities, albeit a somewhat-isolated ivory tower.
The second model is associated with creative destruction, disruptive technology,
and institutional lock-in. This model is expressed by the statement above of Thorp and
Goldstein (2010), and those who support space allocation for startups. Under this model,
entrepreneurs appropriate the spillover benefits of university research. This model
emphasizes the entrepreneur who starts new firms using acquired or retained knowledge.
Moreover, universities interact differently with different types of entrepreneurs. For
instance, the history of the electronics industry indicates that new firms were often
created by dissatisfied employees who left existing firms. Silicon Valley’s rise was in
part due to a close working relationship with Stanford University’s scientists and
engineers. In biotechnology, meanwhile, the entrepreneurs are frequently academics.
The software industry’s entrepreneurs are sometimes students who begin from their
research at university to start new companies (Battelle, 2005; Darby and Brewer, 1997,
Zucker; Friedman, 2004; Friedman, 2009; Lecuyer, 2007; Livingston, 2007).
It should be noted that these economic models are not mutually exclusive, with
the second model often considered a subset of the first (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Fujita
and Thisse, 2001). However, their different emphasis could lead to different policy
decisions and differently structured local or regional economies. Consequently, they are
treated here as two models.
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The treatment of these models as distinct is not unreasonable, since certain
agglomeration effects are often stressed over others. Christophe Lecuyer (2007)
attributes Silicon Valley’s growth to Marshall-associated agglomeration effects, primarily
technology efficiency, with organizations adopting flatter and more flexible structures.
He deemphasizes the public-good aspects of knowledge spillovers, the free ridership of
social networks identified by Saxenian (1996), the monopoly rents associated with
sectors dominated by intellectual capital, and lock lock-in effects , because of consumer
choice or standardization, have allowed companies like Microsoft and Intel to dominate
their markets and reap near-monopoly rents (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999). On the
empirical side, Henderson (2008) contends that economies of agglomeration and
knowledge spillovers have not been sufficiently separated for analysis.
Two universities exemplify the polar distinctions between these models. At one
end is Johns Hopkins University, which for much of its history has had a culture that
discourages professors from collaborating with the private sector (Feldman and
Desrochers, 2003; 2004). At the other end is Stanford University, which has actively
encouraged collaboration and spin-offs and has had a policy to provide incubator space
(O’Mara, 2005). In the case of Stanford, Battelle (2005, p. 67) stated, “Students don’t
come to Stanford just for training. They come for the dream: to start a company, grow
rich, make their mark on the history of technology, and maybe change the world.”
One difficulty is that neither strategic model leads to a clear-cut winner.
Historically, Johns Hopkins has been the largest university recipient of federal research
and development (R&D) money, receiving almost twice as much annually as MIT and
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Stanford. Yet, Johns Hopkins “…lags behind other universities in measures of
technology transfer performance, such as number of patents granted, licensing revenues
and university-based spin-offs” (Feldman and Desrochers, 2004, p. 107).
Overlaying the strategic models and example universities are the organizational
and cultural norms associated with university growth and prestige (the second proposition
I mentioned above). Christensen and Eyring (2011) call this climbing the Carnegie
ladder. The top rung of the ladder is a designation as a research university. To climb the
ladder, lower-ranked universities attempt to emulate elite research universities by adding
laboratory space and hiring star academics. The underlying assumption is that by
emulating the elite research universities, those ranked lower will reap increasing returns
by garnering a greater share of research funds, thereby attracting better academic talent
and more graduate students. Two difficulties are presented, however. One, moving up
the ladder is an expensive and high-risk venture. The winners of such a move appear to
be faculty and administrators, with the costs being born by taxpayers, donors, fundraisers,
and students. “But, whether the additional prestige is worth the gamble is another
question, and one that has become increasingly important in light of the escalating costs
of higher education” (Rhode, 2006, p. 14). The second difficulty is that the cumulative
advantage of the elite research universities may be such that lower-ranked universities
will always be subservient; in other words, the gamble may never pay off at all.
Having presented the assumption and propositions, the next step in developing the
research model is to assess the assumption and to evaluate what prior research says about
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the propositions. Prior research will also help identify the most important variables to
include in the model.

Rational Actor Theory
A consistent assumption in neoclassical economics is that humans are rational
beings and will act in their own self-interest. Given the choice between two goods, an
individual will seek to maximize his or her wellbeing, selecting the good that maximizes
utility. A similar assumption is made about private and public organizations. Firms and
organizations, of course, are legal entities, not individuals with individual preferences.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that such entities seek to maximize institutional self-interest,
as perceived by those who are in control. Such self-interest, when combined with the
desire to make a profit, results in actions that impact the economy and long-term growth.
North (1990, p. 74) notes the potential broader economic impact of one of the
contributors to economic growth, knowledge: “The kinds of knowledge and skills that
will be acquired by the organization to further its objective will in turn play a major role
in the way the stock of knowledge evolves and is used.”
While organizations act in their self-interest, it is essential to distinguish between
the interests and objectives of the individuals who control the organization and the needs
of the firm. Andrew Grove recounted the story of how Intel exited the memory chip
business. He was talking to Gordon Moore, Intel’s Chairman and CEO at the time. “If
we got kicked out and the board brought in a new CEO, what do you think he would do?
Gordon answered without hesitation, ‘He would get us out of memories.’ I stared at him
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numb, then said, ‘Why shouldn’t you and I walk out the door, come back in and do it
ourselves?’”(Grove, 1988, p. 89)
Grove called this incident a strategic inflection point, a point in time at which
decisions become critical for a company’s growth, even its survival. Such points,
however, are difficult to recognize and even more difficult to implement if the needed
change is radical. This is particularly true if the organization has been very successful.
Prior success can blind decision-makers, leading them to make decisions that seem
foolish in hindsight.
The rational actor concept has also been generally accepted in the field of public
administration. In a review of the literature on this topic, Camerer and Fehr (2006)
conclude that under certain conditions, models based on self-regarding preferences and
homogeneous rationality predict aggregate behavior rather well. In short, such models
can be used to predict behavior, because that behavior is frequently consistent and
rational.
Because an organization’s goals and needs sometimes differ from those of its
individual members, organizations have developed procedures to unify and channel
individual actions. The primary mechanisms for doing so include:
1. Dividing work and assigning tasks.
2. Establishing work rules and standards of behavior.
3. Establishing a hierarchy through a system of authority and influence.
4. Indoctrinating members in the values of the organization, through training and
informal means.
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5. Developing and articulating organizational goals and strategic objectives.
(Argyris, 1973, Simon, 1973a)
Organizational and group norms are particularly important for moderating the
conflict between individual goals and organizational needs. With respect to academic
research, a number of norms have evolved over time and seem widely accepted. These
norms, as articulated by Robert Merton (1968), are communism, universalism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. More simply put, academic findings must
be published (communism), knowledge must be subjected to impersonal criteria for
evaluation (universalism), personal interest must be excluded from procedures for
acquiring knowledge (disinterestedness), and criticism is permitted and encouraged
(organized skepticism; Centina, 1991). The general acceptance of these norms
“…guarantee that, unlike other social systems, stratification and scientific inequalities in
science grow by the application of universal criteria, so the most significant contributors
are also the best rewarded” (De Bellis, 2009, p. 56). Feldman and Desrochers (2004)
observe that these norms significantly influenced Johns Hopkins University’s approach to
research, while Thursby and Thursby (2003) assumed the presence of these norms in their
research design.

Agglomeration Effects and Cumulative Advantage
The concept of agglomeration effects is derived from the work of Alfred
Marshall, who identified four main factors that contribute to and are the consequences of
agglomeration: 1) the existence of “thick markets” for specialized labor; 2) the existence
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of knowledge and technology spillovers; 3) the emergence of subsidiary trades; and 4)
the reduction of transportation and communication costs (Fingleton et al., 2007). More
recently, the work of Arrow (1962; 2000) and Romer (1986) has expanded the concept of
externalities to include the interactions between industries and organizations in a model
of knowledge accumulation. Romer’s work is sometimes associated with what is called
new growth theory. In general, the production of new knowledge is said to have
decreasing returns at the firm level. It takes considerable time and energy (some of
which may not prove useful) to produce knowledge. However, there are positive returns
to co-located firms via knowledge spillovers and free-rider appropriation. Co-located
firms can sift through knowledge that is placed in the public domain or obtained through
networking, take what they find useful, and leave the rest. At the initial level of
commercialization, where a new product is dominated by intellectual capital or where
path dependence and market lock-in control, there are increasing returns to generating
knowledge. In knowledge-dominated products, once the knowledge is developed and
transferred to the product, the cost of replication becomes minimal. For instance, the cost
of a computer disk containing Microsoft Office is far less than the cost of developing the
software. In addition, the cost of reproducing millions of copies of the code is equally
small relative to the development cost. Lastly, if the commercializing firm is an early
entrant and is able to establish its product as the standard, it will then gain a majority
share of the market and reap monopoly-like profits. The theory of increasing returns also
emphasizes the importance of timing: it makes little sense to enter a market that is
already close to being locked-in (Arthur, 1996).
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Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) conclude that while some manufacturing firms cluster
to reduce the cost of moving goods, there appears to be a shift in factor intensity,
particularly with respect to education levels. Education levels in metropolitan areas are
positively associated with per capita income and employment growth (Gottlieb and
Fogarty, 2003). High levels of education also appear to help lagging areas reorient and
better adjust to economic shocks (Glaeser and Saiz, 2003). The presence of a research
university helps facilitate economic growth in up-cycles, while also reducing the
magnitude of contraction in a downturn (Lendel, 2010). Thus, urban areas with a high
level of education and higher-ranked universities appear to have an advantage over those
with lower levels of education and lower-ranked universities.
These contributions of education and associated skills appear to hold particularly
well for science-based industries. In examining the expansion of knowledge stock in the
field of nanotechnology, Darby and Zucker (2003) found that the size of the knowledge
stock in a particular geographic area, in terms of both patents and articles published, is
positively related to the creation of knowledge in the field. Similarly, the amount of
National Science Foundation funding awarded to an area is also positively associated
with the development of knowledge stock.
Consistent with new growth theory, entrepreneurial firms tend to locate near
research facilities in order to appropriate knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, Fogarty, and
Banks, 2002). Reinforcing the concentration of such firms is the tendency of star
scientists and engineers to gravitate to highly ranked universities (Zucker and Darby,
2006). Finally, to complete and reinforce this pattern of growth, cumulative advantage
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and positive returns also appear to be at work in the distribution of federal funding. As
Rose (1986, p. 96) observed: “The newest and most modern facility attracts eminent
scientists to an institution; the scientists win vast numbers of research grants; and the
resulting prestige makes the host institution a prime candidate for any additional facility
support that becomes available. The elite research universities are quite naturally pleased
with this process.”
In summation, the presence of highly skilled workers and knowledge diffusion are
seen as key ingredients for economic success. Skill-based cities are both more productive
and have higher rates of economic growth. In fact, there appears to be a cumulative
advantage associated with highly skilled areas: such areas attract higher levels of talent,
larger amounts of research funds, and more firms that want to appropriate the knowledge
stock. Lastly, skill composition may be one of the most powerful predictors of urban
growth.
In another respect, high skill levels, when combined with high levels of research
and development (R&D), provide the seed corn for innovation and entrepreneurship.
This can lead to the development of disruptive technologies and processes, which in turn
allow emerging firms that use new inventions and technologies to replace the old. This is
the second model.
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Creative Destruction and Knowledge Spillover: A Theory of Entrepreneurship
Creative destruction is a dynamic process whose main actor is the entrepreneur, who
creates something new: a technology, a process, a new supply source, or a new
organizational structure. By placing these innovations in the market, the entrepreneur
challenges existing firms and their products. In some cases, the new innovation
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage that challenges not just the margins, but
the very profit foundation of existing products (McGraw, 2007; Swann, 2009). New
technologies or processes disrupt the existing economic balance and, over time,
supersede older, previously established technologies. This succession forces existing
firms to adapt or go out of business. The implications of this process extend beyond the
simple succession of market-dominant firms and products. Caballero and Jaffe (2002,
p. 148) found that the general decline in labor productivity from the 1960s to the mid1980s “…can be traced to a fall in research productivity connected to a decrease in the
potency of old knowledge in generating new ideas.”
To the extent that a metropolitan area is dominated by older firms with
technologies or products that are being challenged or superseded in the marketplace, the
entire area will have a harder time competing. If the metropolitan area becomes unable to
attract or keep highly skilled workers or unable to create an atmosphere conducive to
innovation, the city may slip into a downward spiral. By contrast, “cities of knowledge”
evolve and are sustained because they place considerable emphasis on building university
research capabilities, generating industrial research, and attracting highly skilled workers,
primarily scientists and engineers (O’Mara, 2005).

14
The knowledge stock in a geographic area is primarily endogenous and a result of
the local educational system, in which the university plays a major role. As an
institution, the university consumes goods and services and prepares its graduates for the
workforce with professional training and advanced degrees. Academics provide
consulting services and engage in research and development activities that spill over into
the economy. Other university outputs include capital investment and provision of
regional leadership (Goldstein and Renault, 2004).
Emphasis on the entrepreneur shifts the focus of economic decision-making away
from the exogenous firm to “individual agents with endowments of new economic
knowledge”; however, these agents cannot function if the knowledge stock that results
from R&D is entirely appropriated by existing firms (Aces et al., 2009). Audretsch
(2007) argues that high-technology hubs like Silicon Valley, Austin, San Diego, Boston’s
Route 128, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park represent economic cultures and
clusters that exhibit the attitudes, actions, and values necessary for an entrepreneurial
society. As Audretsch (2007, p. 190–91) observes: “The flagship institutions and policies
in an entrepreneurial society must have an entirely different focus than their counterparts
did in the managed economy. The entrepreneurial society institutions are a departure
from the managed economy stalwarts: unions, big government programs, and corporate
hierarchy.”
In her study of the growth of Silicon Valley, Saxenian (1996) revealed the
importance of network linkages and flatter organizational structures for dynamic
economic environments. Her analysis indicated that, in the semiconductor industry, at
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least, the Route 128 corridor was more closely linked to Audretsch’s “managed
economy.” Further, she observed that the vertical integration, structural hierarchies, and
secrecy that typified Route 128 corporations prevented them from responding quickly
enough to the accelerated pace of technological and market change in semiconductors.
Examining labor mobility and patent citations, Almeida and Kogut (1999) found
that networks and labor mobility were stronger in Silicon Valley than in other
semiconductor clusters in the United States. Labor mobility helped diffuse knowledge
and reinforced an entrepreneurial orientation. In San Diego, a cadre of managers
associated with Hybritech, a company formed in the early 1980s, was instrumental in
founding or strengthening relationships with other local biotechnology companies. These
companies and their associated linkages became the basis for San Diego’s biotechnology
cluster (Casper, 2007).
Networks of relationships are one of the differences between older, established
economic areas and emerging ones. Looking at patent issuance and subsequent citations,
Auerswald and Kulkarni (2008) found that the infrastructure and culture of regions with
emerging technology clusters also differ from older, established regions. Emerging
regions lead in patents for new technology, as well as in “hot patents,” which are
previous generations of patents that lead to innovation. According to their analysis, many
areas with emerging technology economies are on urban peripheries and in small to midsized cities.
These findings of Saxenian (1996), Almeida and Kogut (1999), O’Mara (2005),
Audretsch (2007), and Auerswald and Kulkami (2008) support the idea that knowledge
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spillovers and disruptive innovations facilitate the development of new economic
clusters. This is especially true when technological/institutional lock-in and path
dependence substantially limit the ability of existing firms to appropriate or absorb new
knowledge.
New technologies and ideas challenge the established order, yet because they are
not as well-developed or mature, they may seem inconsequential when compared with
existing products. An early example is provided by the reaction of a British Parliament
committee upon reviewing Thomas Edison’s idea for electrical lighting. The committee
noted that while Edison’s wild dreams might be “good enough for our transatlantic
friends,” they were “unworthy of the attention of practical or scientific men” (Jones,
2003, p. 59) A more recent example concerns the development of the personal computer.
Commenting on the rise of Apple Computer, Berkum (2010) noted that two decisions
facilitated Apple’s success. First, two leading companies—Atari and Hewlett-Packard—
declined to manufacture Apple’s computer. Second, Xerox chose not to market the Alto
computer developed by its California research laboratory. Given the later growth of the
personal computer market, these decisions today seem foolish. However, the managers
of Atari, Xerox, and HP must have believed they were making reasonable business
decisions. Another recent example is the development of the “proof of concept” data for
Genentech’s underlying science. According to Robbins-Roth (2000), when Keichi
Itakura and Art Riggs, two of the scientists associated with the development of the proof
of concept, applied for federal funding, “the reviewers doubted they could do it in the 3year grant time frame and also doubted the scientific merit. Genentech funding did it in 9
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months, and Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Science, called it a
scientific triumph of the first order” (p. 16).
More generally, seemingly minor decisions made early in the establishment of a
new technology can have large subsequent impacts (Arthur, 1996, 2009; Swann, 2009).
Once a technology or process is established, it becomes harder for the organization using
it to change. “If it were desirable to re-establish an excluded technology—say steam
propulsion—an ever widening technical changeover gap would have to be closed”
(Arthur, 1996, p. 46). Intellectually and technologically, organizations using dominant
technologies or ideas tend to be locked in. “It’s both a psychological and economical
phenomenon: as people and companies’ age, they have more to lose. … Attitudes
focused on security, risk aversion, and optimization of the status quo eventually become
the dominant positions, and even become organizational policy at companies that were
once young, nimble and innovative” (Berkum, 2010, p. 62)
Under conditions of lock-in and path-dependence, the attackers—new firms using
new technology or processes—have an advantage. If a technology or process happens to
become dominant and locked-in, a company using it will reap monopoly profits and
expand substantially, just as Microsoft and Intel did. The growth of new companies
under such conditions can help create both critical mass and a comparative advantage for
the geographic regions in which they are located.
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The Role of Universities
The role that universities play in economic development is both historically
important and wide-ranging. Reviewing the development of the Industrial Revolution in
Western Europe, Mokyr (2002) argued that the presence of academies, universities, and
research institutes, along with the “…rules by which they play (such as open science,
credit by priority, reproducibility of experiments, and rhetorical rules of acceptance)
helped determine its historical path” (p. 288). Mokyr also argued that technological
advances are in part determined by the ability of educational systems to teach technical
skills and enhance workers’ ability to absorb new knowledge and employ it in innovative
ways.
Thorp and Goldstein (2010), Audretsch (2007), O’Mara (2005), Zucker et al.
(1998), and Saxenian (1996) all emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship and
universities for creating the culture and infrastructure urban areas and regions need to
reach critical mass and sustain economic growth. Universities are also uniquely qualified
to bring disparate groups together to find solutions to problems that seem intractable. As
Trani and Holsworth (2010) observed: “The upshot is that modern colleges and
universities possess resources—scientific, commercial, medical, and cultural—that are
vital to the entire range of community and regional development activities relevant to the
contemporary knowledge economy” (p. 220).
Universities provide the ingredients regions need to develop and sustain their
comparative advantage (Feldman, 2007; Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks, 2002). As noted
above, they provide employment and training. University research also contributes
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substantially to the development of new innovations and technologies (Mansfield, 1991).
Equally importantly, universities contribute to the stock of knowledge from which new
innovations and technologies are drawn. Academic papers have a greater spillover effect
than do industry papers (Adams, Clemmons, and Stephan, 2006). In addition, coauthorship between star scientists and/or top-ranked university scientists and company
scientists increases the number and citations of that firm’s patents (Zucker, Darby and
Armstrong, 1998).
Firms tend to locate near major research universities in order to tap into tacit
knowledge (Darby and Zucker, 2003). However, Bania, Eberts, and Fogarty (1993)
found that the impact of universities on startups may be industry-specific. Their analysis
found a significant association between university research and electrical and electronicequipment industries. However, for instruments and related products, the relationship
was insignificant. Moreover, they found that greater numbers of scientists and engineers
in the workforce did not have an effect on number of startups.
Biotechnology is one area where there is a strong linkage between the university
and the development of economic clusters (Friedman, 2004; Friedman, 2009; Zucker,
Darby and Brewer, 1998). The rise of the Washington, DC area as a biotechnology
center is one example. The Washington area had little biotechnology presence in 1973,
with only ten biotechnology companies. By the late 1990s, however, there were over 300
biotechnology companies in the DC area. Maryland ranked third in 1999, behind
California and Massachusetts, among US states in the number of biotechnology
companies, and the state ranked third, behind California and New York, in the number of
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scientists and engineers with doctorates working in biotechnology (Feldman and Francis,
2003). Reviewing the growth of the DC biotechnology industry, Feldman (2007) noted
“…conditions favored new-firm formation, perhaps in part due to the lack of an
established large pharmaceutical company that could engineer mergers or acquisitions”
(p. 256). A key factor in the growth of biotechnology in the Washington area appears to
have been a reduction in federal employment, which left many government scientists out
of work, creating a surplus of highly skilled labor. Slowly, networks of entrepreneurs,
policymakers, and suppliers began to form. At the same time, local universities, colleges,
and technical centers recognized the need for more high-technology-oriented training and
began to offer needed programs.
Case studies of San Diego and Atlanta (Walcolt, 1999; 2002) and Cincinnati
(Ferrand et al., 2009) have indicated that the presence of local universities facilitated
biotechnology development there. Lester’s (2005) examination of economic activity and
growth in localities worldwide found that the contribution universities make to economic
growth depends on the type of economic growth that is occurring, concluding as follows:
In cases of new industry creation a local university or public research
laboratory typically played the role of anchor institution, whereas in the
case of upgrading the anchor institution was more likely to be a lead firm
or lead customer. In science-based industry formation the highest-impact
educational outputs of local universities were PhD-level scientists and
engineers with an interest in entrepreneurial careers and some exposure to
entrepreneurial business practices. (p. 23)
Regardless of the model—agglomeration or creative destruction—existing
research appears to agree on three points. First, universities are important contributors to
areas' economic development and stability (Feldman and Florida, 1994; O’Mara, 2005;
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Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998). Second, money to sustain research, generally
channeled through a research university, is a key contributor to economic growth,
although the impact of research funds is still unsettled. For example, Bloom-Kohout,
Kumar, and Sood (2009) found that for every dollar of federal extramural research
funding received in the life sciences, non-federal funding increased by $0.33. In
pharmaceuticals, a 1% increase in public basic research (specifically, NIH funding)
ultimately led to a 1.8% increase in the number of new firms (Toole, 2012). Woodward,
Figueiredo, and Guimaraes (2006) found that the impact of research funds is generally
marginal, ranging from 0.04 to 0.004 percent per million-dollar increase in R&D funding.
Third, there must be an intertwining of government, universities, and private companies,
which is called the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz, 2008; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000;
O’Mara, 2005). In the Triple Helix, each entity reinforces and challenges the others with
new ideas and new needs. The result is a capitalization of knowledge similar to the
development of physical infrastructure. Etzkowitz (2008) concludes as follows:
When knowledge is transformed into capital, persons from any originating
organization may be potential entrepreneurs and founders of firms. A
triple helix in which each strand may relate to the other, two can be
expected to develop an “overlay of communications, networks, and
organizations among the helices”. (p. 20).
This combination results in a constructive advantage, which is defined as “… a
strategic policy perspective of practical use to business firms, associations, academics
and policy makers” (Cooke, 2006, p. 188). The need for such a policy is one of the
lessons O’Mara (2005) draws from the growth of “Cities of Knowledge”: hightechnology development must be “the end, not the means.”(p. 230)
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Yale University provides a practical example of the Triple Helix. Its experience
also suggests that internal changes in the university are often necessary. Prior to 1993,
Yale had a culture regarding innovation that cost it foregone remuneration from a number
of faculty inventions. Between 1993 and 1996, “…the arrival of young faculty members
from universities traditionally collaborating with industry contributed to a cultural change
at Yale. Moreover, successful commercialization has also contributed to the creation of a
new culture at Yale that supports technology transfer” (Breznitz, 2014, p. 75).
As a result of this cultural change, the staff in Yale’s Office of Technology
Transfer (OTT) was upgraded. By 2004, the OTT employed eighteen professionals with
five-to-seven years of experience in private industry. The process of licensing and
spinning-out companies was changed to make it easier for faculty to do so. The focus
was also shifted from simply licensing and patenting to transferring inventions to the
public domain.
Between 1996 and 2011, royalties increased from a little over $5 million annually
to $11 million. By 2012, Yale was averaging 24 patents a year and had had 55 spin-outs
and companies, of which 29 were biotechnology spin outs.
To catalyze the capitalization of new businesses, Yale brought together venture
capitalists, local companies, and local and state government agencies with the goal of
facilitating the development of economic clusters in New Haven and Connecticut. In
sum, without the cultural change and committed leadership at Yale, New Haven’s
biotechnology cluster might not exist.
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Star Scientists and Engineers
The case of Yale and biotechnology suggests that there is often a direct linkage
between startups and university scientists. Zhang and Patel (2005) found that between
1990 and 2000, scientists working at universities or research laboratories founded close
to half of venture-backed biotechnology startups, about two-thirds of which stayed in the
same state as the university or laboratory. Examining the relationship between human
capital and the birth of biotechnology companies in various regions throughout the
United States, Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998) found three significant factors: 1) a
concentration of what the authors term “star scientists” or what Audretsch (2001) calls
the “best scientific talent”; 2) the presence of major research universities; and 3) federal
funding. Of the three factors, the presence of star scientists and engineers was considered
the most important. In fact, once the number of star scientists is statistically controlled,
the effects of the local and national economic infrastructures disappear (Zucker and
Darby, 1996). Stars, defined as scientists with twenty or more discovery articles, account
for a higher percentage of new innovations than do their counterparts (Zucker, Darby and
Brewer, 1998). While star scientists represented only 0.8% of scientists listed in the GenBank through 1990, they accounted for 17.3% of published articles, or about 22 times the
average Gen-Bank scientist (Zucker and Darby, 1996). Star scientists also tend to
congregate, moving from lower- to higher-ranked universities and to locations with
greater opportunity. The presence of star scientists and engineers is positively associated
with firm location and new-firm creation, which contributes to a concentration of hightechnology industries in their vicinity (Zucker and Darby, 1996).
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The Carnegie Ladder
The Carnegie Ladder refers to a classification of academic institutions developed
by the Carnegie Foundation, as follows: Research Universities, Doctoral Universities,
Comprehensive Institutions, Liberal Arts Colleges and Two Year Colleges, and
Specialized Institutions. While there is evidence of a cumulative advantage among toptier institutions, some convergence in terms of publication volume has also occurred.
Evidence of publication convergence led Dey, Milem, and Berger (1997) to observe that
“it is not surprising that institutions at the lower levels in the hierarchy are attempting to
be more isomorphic with regard to the publication-productivity rates of the top-tier
institutions, given the higher visibility and greater influx of research funds that result
from high rates of productivity” (p. 320).
Reviewing the approach taken by the University of Chicago in assembling the
faculty in economics that became known as the Chicago School and which is associated
with a number of Nobel Laureates, Overtveldt (2007) remarked that the approach taken in
the earliest days was simple: “We look for home runs” (p. 29). Administrators sought
economists that, because of their extensive scholarship, were very likely to make
breakthroughs in the discipline.
Obtaining the best possible academic talent has long been the conventional
wisdom in higher education. Cole (2009) considered talent accumulation a necessary
condition for institutional excellence. His historical analysis of research universities
reinforced the notion of an accumulative advantage and points to the allure of being one
of the best. He concludes as follows:
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The oldest private and public universities used their early advantage—
better faculty attracted stronger students, stronger students meant greater
alumni contributions, greater alumni contributions led to better research
facilities, better research facilities drew better faculty and so on.
Advantages such as these allowed top universities to accumulate even
more resources from individuals and institutional backers in order to
create still greater advantages in competing for talent. (p. 34–35)
Stanford University’s history of growth illustrates the cumulative advantage of a
top-ranked university, but it also serves as evidence that middling institutions can become
powerhouses. Leland Stanford and his wife founded a junior college as a memorial for
their son. Centered on farmland in Palo Alto, California, Stanford opened its doors in
1891. By 1945 it was a regional university “with aspirations.” By 1961, it had ten
departments in the top echelon of U.S. universities, as rated by the American Council on
Education. By 1984, the American Council on Education ranked Stanford’s engineering
school third, just behind UC Berkeley and MIT (Adams, 2009).
The guiding light for Stanford’s ascent was Fredrick Terman, the provost and
Dean of Engineering. Terman implemented a number of significant changes in the way
Stanford operated. He sought to create strong connections with the local business
community. He created steeples of excellence by attracting eminent scholars, under the
belief that these stars would attract other stars, as well as attracting money from federal
and private sources. He also encouraged faculty to supplement their university income
by consulting for private companies. Lastly, he helped create the Stanford Industrial
Park, where new and existing firms could be in close proximity to the university’s
facilities and faculty.
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Stanford’s development was a slow process and not without controversy. The
shifting of the political science department to a behavioral approach (which eventually
raised its rankings) is a case in point. In 1957, Terman and Stanford’s President Sterling
blocked the department’s choice for chair, Mulford Q Sibley. This created a
confrontation with faculty members and a furor in the press. However, Terman wanted to
hire a star with a behavioral approach, consistent with his view of the direction the
university needed to take in order to align with the preferences of potential funders.
Ultimately, the university hired Gabriel Almond as chair in 1963. Sidney Verba, a leader
in comparative politics with a behavioral approach, moved from Princeton to Stanford a
year later. During this seven-year period, the department’s ranking rose from thirteenth
to seventh (Lowen, 1997).
While Terman did not build steeples of excellence across the entire university, his
overall approach was successful. The symbiotic relationship between Stanford
University and local businesses would lead to an economic dynamo that became known
as Silicon Valley. Between 1988 and 1996, startup companies linked to Stanford
accounted for 60% of the revenue generated by all Silicon Valley firms (Gibbons, 2000).
By 1998, Silicon Valley’s publicly held companies had a market capitalization of $743
billion—while Detroit’s automotive industry was capitalized at $136 billion and
Hollywood’s entertainment firms were capitalized at $76 billion (Nevens, 2000).
As Silicon Valley companies flourished, Stanford’s standing as a top-tier research
university became firmly established. As of 2006, its 264 National Academy-elected
members ranked behind only Harvard (with 284 members). Also in 2006, the size of
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Harvard’s endowment ranked first, while Stanford’s ranked third. In research dollars
received, Stanford ranked eighth behind top-ranked Johns Hopkins (The Center for
Measuring University Performance, 2008). Thus, Stanford has become a prime example
of an entrepreneurial university.

The Entrepreneurial University
The aura of Silicon Valley and its symbiotic relationship with Stanford has led
other universities, as well as governments, to seek to replicate Stanford’s strategy. The
University of Louisville, for instance, was able to increase its NIH funding between 1996
and 2006 from 95th to 73rd place, or from $20 million to over $90 million. This was
accomplished through a series of initiatives that included “bucks for brains,” a statefunded program used to create and fill endowed chairs with faculty who are exceptional
contributors to their fields. University and local leadership expected that these faculty
would “bring major extramural grants and contracts to the university” (Schweitzer,
Sessler, and Martin, 2008, p. 564).
At the national level, Congress endorsed the concept of an entrepreneurial
university in passing the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allows universities to license and
patent inventions and innovations derived from federally sponsored grants. The
expectation was that a greater amount of university-to-industry technology transfers
would occur, which in turn would garner additional revenues from fees and licenses
(Mowery et al., 2004).
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The Bayh-Dole Act has contributed to the creation of technology transfer offices
within universities and has also resulted in an increase in the number of patents issued to
colleges and universities. The impact of the Bayh-Dole Act is still being debated.
Aldridge and Audretsch (2010) found that 70% of university scientists with grants from
the National Cancer Institute (NCI) who commercialize their research do so through their
university’s office of technology, while the other thirty percent use the back door of
commercializing their research through spinouts. Mowery et al. (2004) questioned
whether the Act has been an important contributor to the university’s impact on economic
growth and development, noting that universities had conducted research and made
substantial economic contributions to local economies long before the Bayh-Dole Act.
The research of Thorp and Goldstein (2010) fall somewhere in the middle. They noted
that only a few universities have reaped substantive financial rewards from licensing.
Among these is Emory University, with $320 million from the AIDS drug Emtriva, the
University of Florida, with $80 million from Gatorade, and Columbia University, with
$600 million from Axel genetic-engineering techniques. Consequently, they argued that
universities ought to be less concerned about the revenue generated by licensing and
more concerned about how the office of technology transfer can be used to simplify the
process of licensing and patenting products and inventions:
By making it easier for faculty to obtain patents and negotiate license
deals and spin out-out companies, the university keeps faculty engaged
and connected and therefore less likely to leave. Providing faculty with
equity ownership is cheaper than a salary increase, especially if money for
an increase must come from an endowment where, typically, only 5
percent per year is expendable. (Thorp and Goldstein, 2010, p. 35)
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Improvements to the technology transfer system are but one aspect of Thorp and
Goldstein’s argument. The overall thrust of their argument is that to stay competitive in a
knowledge-based and increasingly global economy, universities need to reorient their
culture to become more entrepreneurial. This includes seeking out a wider variety of
funding, which often facilitates collaboration and the flow of information. They believe
that an entrepreneurial emphasis also encourages labs to focus on outputs and results,
which increases the impact of their research. This in turn helps garner additional funds
for research.
Thorp and Goldstein’s argument that universities are not entrepreneurial enough
emphasizes the competing strategies that underpin the drive to move up the Carnegie
Ladder. Comparing Stanford’s rise with the standing of UC Berkeley, Adams (2009)
concludes that Stanford had three things that Berkeley did not: 1) the right leader; 2) a
long-term strategy; and 3) it faced a financial predicament that made entrepreneurial
activity both attractive and necessary. In a review of Fredrick Terman’s attempts to
replicate Stanford’s success elsewhere, Leslie and Kargon (1996) found few successful
examples. They conclude that Terman did not recognize how much his leadership and
the circumstances associated with post-World War II spending combined with the unique
characteristics of the small start-ups in Silicon Valley to create an economic dynamo. In
short, the development of Silicon Valley might be an isolated example of fortunate
circumstances.
If the Stanford experience was unique, attempts to replicate its dynamics might be
futile. Along the same lines, becoming more entrepreneurial might not garner a
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university a very large return, as evidenced by the limited number of universities that
garner substantive funding from licensing. The question then becomes: is it possible to
move up the university rankings, or do those at the top have such an absolute advantage
that doing so is futile?

Universities and Research Funding
Research regarding the relationship between a university’s funding and its ranking
indicates a degree of fluidity. Geiger and Feller (1995) analyzed total federal research
funds distributed to American universities from 1952 to 1990, showing that the
percentage of total federal research funds received by the ten largest performers
decreased over that time from 43.4% to 20.1%. There were ten Tier I losers, while Tier
II Universities increased their share, with 14 gainers and six losers. The financial
condition of universities did not explain these changes; rather, gaining institutions
became more like the Tier I institutions (Geiger and Feller, 1995). In an examination of
research awards to universities from 1972 to 1994, Brewer, Gates, and Goldman (2001)
found little overall change. In 1972, ten institutions attracted 25% of the research
funding, and 29 attracted 50%. In 1994, 13 institutions had 25%, and 35 had 50%.
However, among individual institutions there was fluidity. There were more gainers (12)
than losers (7). The authors postulated that more institutions sought research funds
because total research funding increased over this period. Quon (2001) found that the
NIH funding rankings of medical schools from 1990 to 2000 were likewise fluid:
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In general, large changes in rank were more frequent for schools ranked
lower to begin with, no doubt in part because the actual dollar amounts of
their total awards were proportionately less. Nevertheless, large moves
also occurred in the top-tier schools, illustrating that even the most
research-intensive schools can experience substantial and sustainable
changes in ranking. (p. 2)
More broadly, Bania et al. (1991) found that increases in NIH funding contributed
to a shift in university positions. The top universities moved up by being more
competitive within fields rather than by specializing in the right mix of fields. University
degree programs were a vital contribution to the area’s research base. Another major
contributor to university’s ability to obtain NIH funding was investment in infrastructure,
particularly science and engineering facilities and equipment.

University Funding and Variable Interaction
Studies of the relationship between university funding and performance have
sometimes used a basic production function approach (Bania, Eberts, and Fogarty, 1993;
Adams and Griliches, 1998; Lendel, 2010). The university receives funds and produces
products: students and publications. However, the nature of the relationship between
funding and output, particularly publications, is inconclusive. Summarizing his own and
other research, Landel (2010) noted two major conditions that impact the relationship: 1)
top-ranked scientists receive more funding because they are better-connected and have
better reputations for producing solid research; and 2) recurrent funding is important for
sustaining focused research, and better-funded universities have the capability to provide
recurrent funding. In a review of the impact of industry funding in the life sciences,
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Campbell, Koski, and Blumenthal (2004) found that such funding allowed academics to
publish more.
Reviewing the research on publication productivity among scientists, Fox (1983)
concluded that one of the main determinants of successful publication is location at a
prestigious university. Because the elite institutions have resources to advance the work
of their academicians, superior talent gravitates to these locations, which in turn furthers
their advantage. Pessimistically, but consistent with the notion of cumulative advantage,
he concluded that since the elite institutions already have sufficient opportunities to
obtain resources, there is probably no help for those institutions at the bottom.
Publications are an important output of universities and are an important
determinant of their receipt of research funds. McAllister and Condon (1985), Pagel and
Hudetz (2011a; 2011b), and Pao (1991) all found a positive association between NIH
funding and the quantity and nature of university publications. This association also
appears to hold true for papers in biomedical subfields (McAllister and Condon, 1985).
Jacob and Lefgren (2007) estimated that NIH funding results in the publication of one
additional article over a five-year period. Boyack and Jordan (2011), also looking at NIH
grants and associated publications, found that the median time lag to publication was
three years and that each grant leads to approximately 1.7 new articles. Further, articles
acknowledging NIH grants were cited twice as much as non-grant-acknowledging
articles. Lastly, Pagel and Hudetz (2011a; 2011b) found that the H-index, an indicator of
reputation as represented by citations per article, was positively associated with receipt of
NIH funds.
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Understanding what drives publication activity has important implications for a
university’s impact on the larger community. Individual motivation, as opposed to
outside activity, plays a part in publication. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) found that
researchers at MIT are driven primarily by interest in the research field, making
publishing decisions on a case-by-case basis. Academics who license an invention or
who are involved in a startup continue to publish at a rate consistent with or higher than
their peers (Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila, 2007; Thursby and Thursby, 2003). Star
scientists, regardless of their level of involvement with private-sector firms, tend to
generate a larger number of publications than do their peers (Zucker and Darby, 1996).
Agrawal, McHale, and Oettle (2012), examining the impact of star scientists on
departmental productivity, found that productivity increases with the arrival of a star.
However, there is a view that as researchers age, their publications decline in
quantity (Baser and Pema, 2004; Gingras et al., 2008; Levin and Stephan, 1991).
However, Wray (2003) found that young scientists are not necessarily more frequent
publishers than older ones, because they are not as well-positioned to make revolutionary
discoveries. He concluded that middle-aged scientists are the best-positioned.
There also appears to be an aging effect with respect to citations of published
work. Parolo et al. (2015) found that citations reach their peak a few years after the date
of publication, decaying rapidly thereafter. Papers with fewer citations decay more
rapidly. Pollman (2000) found that aging occurs by at least four years from publication.
Redner (2005), looking at citations of work published in the journal Physical Review over
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a 110-year span, found that average citation age was 6.2 years but found it to be less than
two years with only 3.6 citations for articles published before 2000.
Institutionally, there may be some convergence in terms of publications. A timeseries analysis of the publications of Carnegie-categorized universities by Dey, Milem,
and Berger (1997) found evidence to support both the cumulative-advantage and mobility
perspectives. The universities at the top of the Carnegie ladder had high rates of
publication. However, many institutions in the middle also had high rates of publication.
They conclude that those institutions in the middle with higher rates of publication have
an opportunity to join the elite.
While the relationship between research funding and publication is complex, it
may also be mutually reinforcing. As McAllister and Condon (1985) noted, “it takes
money to do research, but one has great difficulty obtaining awards without a good
publication record” (p. 74). Further, when research funding is linked directly to
publication, there is a direct impact on the level and type of publications (Butler, 2004;
Jimenez-Contreras et al., 2003; Reinhart, 2009).
At the institutional level, research on the relationship between total NIH funding
received and average articles published per faculty member is inconclusive. Sandstrom
(2009) found that the association between publications and federal funding is generally
weak. Alternatively, Adams and Griliches (1998) found decreasing returns to the effect
of publications on grant funds received. One possible reason for these decreasing returns
is the growing number of journals and virtual media in which an academic can present
research findings (Kim, Morse, and Zingales, 2006). The growing number of options for
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information dissemination makes it more difficult to assess the impacts of scholarly
activity. Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010), however, found a strong statistical
relationship between publications in 2002–03 and grant dollars received. They also
found decreasing returns for the number of publications versus grant dollars received and
a disparity in grant dollars by academic field. For instance, academics in the Biological
and Biomedical Sciences field receive larger amounts of total grant funds than do
academics in the Physical and Mathematical Sciences field.
In summary, history indicates that universities have moved up the Carnegie
Ladder. Sustained federal funding provides the resources institutions need to develop the
infrastructure required to create a virtuous cycle and move up the ladder. Conventional
wisdom indicates that attracting star scientists and engineers is a key component to
movement up the ladder. Stars have higher publication rates, and because of the positive
and possibly mutually reinforcing association between publications and federal funding,
conventional wisdom and prior research indicate that stars attract higher levels of federal
funding. However, citation rates peak soon after publication, decreasing rapidly
thereafter, which calls into question the conventional wisdom that stars automatically
generate positive returns. Further, the distribution of research funds may be sensitive to
field-specific activity; thus, broad generalization may not be appropriate.
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Chapter 2: Research Design

Overview
In an economy driven by innovation and entrepreneurship, research universities
generate the discoveries and spillovers that help develop a constructive advantage. A key
element in this regard is the level of research funding received; without support for R&D,
the ability to develop a constructive advantage is diminished. This dissertation will
attempt to determine which variables contribute to universities successfully obtaining
research funds. It will also attempt to determine if star scientists garner a higher share of
research funds and estimate the extent to which their presence produces spillover benefits
among their university colleagues.
The bulk of public funding for R&D comes from the federal government. The
main recipient of federal research dollars is the individual academic, who submits
requests for funding through his or her grant proposals. In addition to the technical
aspects of any proposal, the characteristics, productivity, and reputation of the researcher
play a role in awards of grant funding (Boyack and Jordan, 2011; Kienholz and Berg,
2014; McAllister and Narin, 1985; Pao, 1991; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002).
One criticism of the federal research-funding process is that peer review panels
steer funds to those institutions with which the members of the panel are affiliated (Rose,
1996). To the extent that grant funds are allocated based on characteristics beyond the
specific merits of research proposals, there might exist a normative profile of who is best
qualified. The policies of the university and its reputation may also contribute to the
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successful receipt of grant funds (Bania et al., 1991). The extent to which such a profile
exists can be assessed by examining the statistical effects of personal and university
characteristics on the receipt of federal funds.
Once an academic submits a proposal, the funding agency determines if the
proposal merits funding. The dominant funding sources in the biotechnology disciplines
in the United States are the National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH grants are also a
dominant funding source for Nobel Laureates in the United States (Tatsioni, Vavva, and
Ioannidis, 2010).
Grant proposals to the NIH are subject to a rigorous review process that is
divorced from the input of staff (Ross, 2000). The Center for Scientific Review, with
17,000 external experts, reviews at least a portion of 70% of NIH funding requests. The
review process is also considered to be the most consistent in funding use-inspired basic
research (Stokes, 1997).
Figure 1 presents the broad categories into which specific variables that influence
NIH funding can be arranged.

Broadly, these fall into four categories: 1) General

Environmental, including general geographic and population characteristics; 2)
Institutional/University, including variables associated with the university; 3)
Departmental, including variables associated with the department or institute in which the
researcher is located; and 4) Researcher Characteristics.

38

NIH Funds
General Environmental
Population, Education,
Skill Levels

Institutional Factors
Equipment,
Public/Private
Strategic Policies

Departmental/Institutional
Rating of Department,
Multiple Appointments

NIH Awards

Researcher
Characteristics
Star, Gender,
Publications, Citations,
Position, Degree

Figure 1. Factors Influencing NIH Awards.

Except for the work of Bania et al. (1991), little has been done to analyze key
characteristics distinguishing NIH recipients from non-recipients. While Hendrix (2008)
estimated the relationship between NIH funding received and the number of articles
published per faculty member, he focused on the university rather than the individual.
Zucker and Darby (1996) compared the performance of star scientists with that of nonstars but did not look specifically at NIH recipients, nor did they explore whether
increasing returns are associated with NIH funding received. Ali, Bhattacharyya, and
Olejniczak (2010) investigated the receipt of federal grant money from multiple sources,
academic productivity, and institutional characteristics using a Tobit model. The
independent variables included whether the university is a public or private member of
the American Association of Universities, the percent of university academics who have
published articles, broad department breakdowns, number of articles published, the
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number of articles squared, and those articles’ associated citations for the time frame
2003 to 2004. They did not consider whether there is a difference among highly cited
researchers, grant recipients and non-recipients, and institutional academic rank. While
they included a geographic distribution, they did not include variables such as university
rank, metropolitan size, whether or not there is a medical school, or the number of
institutional NIH recipients in the geographic area. This work examines a larger number
of possible contributing factors.

Research Questions
This dissertation will attempt to address some of the gaps in the research by
exploring the following empirical questions:
1. Do Highly Cited Researchers receive significantly more NIH funding than do
others?
2. Does the number of members of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences at a
university positively contribute to NIH funding? (Is there a faculty-level halo
effect?)
3. Does having a degree from a top-ranked university contribute positively to the
amount of NIH funding received?
4. Does the number of articles published in the two years immediately preceding the
receipt of NIH funds have a positive impact on the level of NIH funding?
5. Does the average number of citations per article published in the preceding two
years positively affect the level of NIH funding?
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6. Is there a difference in publication performance between NIH recipients and nonrecipients?
7. Do academics who license an innovation or invention through the university’s
Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) receive more NIH funding than other
recipients?
8. Do academics who are part of a spinout receive more NIH funding than do other
recipients?
9. Does being listed as an inventor on a patent application by the university
contribute positively to the receipt of NIH funding?

The research design builds on the work of Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak
(2010), Sandstrom (2009), Hendrix (2008), McAllister and Condon (1985), and
McAllister and Narin (1983). In its simplest form, the design postulates a direct
relationship between a researcher’s NIH funding and his or her prior publications. A key
assumption is that current funding is in part a function of the number of articles an
academic published in prior years. The most recent preceding years, in this case 2006 to
2007, are assumed to be the most important. A further assumption is that research is
driven more by individual interest and professional norms than by funding levels. These
professional norms, as noted in the previous chapter, are communism, universalism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. The postulated existence of these norms
allows for the possibility that peer reviewers, consciously or unconsciously, follow a set
of standards by which they measure professional credibility.
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Both the underlying assumptions and prior research results indicate that a model
with just two variables—funding and total publications—is too simplistic. Additional
variables are needed to account for other possible factors influencing NIH awards. Some
of the factors to be tested include whether the recipient is a star scientist, the recipient’s
gender, whether the recipient’s degree is from a top-ranked university nationally or
globally, the number of high-caliber academics located at the university, the type of
degree the recipient has received, the average citations per recipient’s article published in
2006 to 2007, his or her career citations to 2007, the number of patents issued the
recipient prior to funding, whether or not he or she has licensed innovations/inventions,
and whether or not he or she is involved in the spin out of a company. Most of these
factors have been considered in research at the individual level (Audretsch and Aldridge,
2009; Buccola, Ervin, and Yang, 2009; Thursby and Thursby, 2003; Van den Besselaar
and Leydesdorff, 2009; Wood, 1990).

Sample Characteristics
The sample includes all NIH recipients for 2008 from 24 universities and all nonrecipients who have a PhD or MD, who are tenured or assistant professors, and who are
in the same department or institute in which the recipients are located.
Non-recipients of NIH awards are included in order to allow comparisons among
non-recipients, recipients, and stars in terms of the various performance measures. Since
the members of the non-recipient group have zero funding, a censored condition exists in
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the dependent variable; thus, a Tobit estimation procedure is employed (Gujarati, 2003;
Kennedy, 2003).
Table 1 shows the twenty-four universities that have been selected for analysis.
The sample includes three universities from the 1996 NIH funding recipient categories of
1–50, five from 51–100, six from 101–150, four from 151–200, and five from 201 and
above, along with Portland State University (which is not ranked). With respect to
geographic representation, the universities are distributed as follows: Northeast—3;
Southeast—6; Midwest—4; Mountain West—5; and Pacific—5.

Dependent Variables
The three metrics representing the NIH awards that have been chosen to serve as
dependent variables are as follows: 1) 2008 NIH total funds received per individual; 2)
2008 average amount of NIH Grants received per individual; and 3) 2008 total number of
grants received per individual (source: NIH Extramural research grants).
NIH funding was chosen for this analysis for four reasons: 1) NIH is the major
federal funding source for biomedical research; 2) the NIH peer review process is
substantive and merit-driven; 3) the review process is considered to be the most
consistent in funding use-inspired basic research; and 4) allocation of funds is based in
part on the concept of “contribution to the field.”
The use of all funds received is based on the idea that regardless of type, federal
money contributes to a researcher’s reputation and is a basis for receipt of additional
funds. Thus, no distinction is made between the types of funds received (i.e., research
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project grants, individual or institutional training grants, or construction grants). Further,
while there are different NIH Institutes, it is assumed all Institutes follow similar
procedures for allocating NIH funds, in short, that there is a unity in the allocation
process. This assumption is consistent with the approach of other studies. For instance,
Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010) treated grants from the NIH, the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as having had similar
approaches to allocation. Druss and Marcus (2005), while focusing on NIH grants,
treated the allocation criteria of R01 grants the same regardless of awarding institute.
Feeney and Welch (2014) simply focused on the amount of the academic’s successful
grant award and whether or not the individual is a Principal Investigator or Co-Principal
Investigator.
Where multiple grants are awarded, the total award is used, which may cause
some measurement error, because the individual variables are counted once regardless of
whether a person received one grant of $300,000 or three for $100,000. While the total
amount an academic receives seems more reflective of stature, in order to ensure robust
analysis, the average size of grant award and the number of grants awarded per individual
will also be used as dependent variables.

Independent Variables
The model’s independent variables are grouped into three categories: 1)
individual; 2) institutional; and 3) environmental. Insufficient data or inconsistency in
University reports prevented the use of departmental-level data.
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Individual Variables
Characteristics of the individuals in the model related to prior scholarship include:
1) number of articles published in 2006 and 2007; 2) average number of citations per
article published in 2006 and 2007; 3) total career citations; and 4) highly cited
researcher, a binary variable (0, 1; source: Thomason Reuters Science Citation Index).

Table 1. Sample Universities.
NIH Funding Rank
1996
2005 University
17
18 Case Western Reserve University
30
30 U of Colorado Health Science Center
44
49 University of Utah
54
59 University of Arizona
65
33 Oregon Health Sciences University
72
60 University of Cincinnati
71
80 Virginia Commonwealth University
99
105 University of Memphis
109
110 University of Missouri
108
119 Temple University
117
108 University of Oklahoma
114
99 Brown University
139
128 University of Georgia
147
165 University of Oregon
157
133 Arizona State University
160
171 Washington State University
167
193 University of Mississippi
181
214 Oregon State University
411
197 Georgia Institute of Technology
204
78 University of Louisville
214
185 University of Nevada
224
317 University of Rhode Island
240
257 Wright State University
Portland State University

State
OH
CO
UT
AZ
OR
OH
VA
TN
MO
PA
OK
RI
GA
OR
AZ
WA
MS
OR
GA
KY
NV
RI
OH
OR

City
Region
Cleveland
Middle
Denver
West
Salt Lake City West
Tucson
West
Portland
Pacific
Cincinnati
Middle
Richmond
SE
Memphis
SE
Columbia
Middle
Philadelphia NE
Norman
Middle
Providence
NE
Athens
SE
Eugene
Pacific
Tempe
West
Pullman
Pacific
University
SE
Corvallis
Pacific
Atlanta
SE
Louisville
SE
Reno
West
Kingston
NE
Dayton
Middle
Portland
Pacific
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Problems are associated with several of these measures. First, the focus on
publications and citations limits the representation of scholarship, excluding meetings,
editorial material, and book chapters. Second, variations in authors’ names create
difficulty determining precise publication and citation counts. In this instance, the
author’s last and first names are used. For articles and citations from 2006–07, the
university is also identified. For career citations, the university is added when it is
difficult to link a specific article to the person in the sample. This procedure will likely
cause an undercount. An additional problem occurs, because of the use on a university
identifier, where an academic moves from one university to another. To alleviate this
problem, I add two additional variables: 1) the second derivatives of the total number of
2006–07 articles published, which mitigates some of the problems associated with career
cites and also helps test for increasing or decreasing returns; and 2) the total number of
citations for each article published in 2006–07.
Another problem is that I assume that the Principal Investigator (PI) is the key
determinant in the receipt of NIH funds. The work of Feeney and Welch (2014) provides
support for this assumption, as they find that PIs have higher productivity than CoPrincipal Investigators and other team members. Highlighting the importance of the PIs,
Mangematin et al. (2014) stated, “The necessity for universities and public research
centers to identify high performance scientists with the potential to become star principal
investigators at an early stage in their career is apparent” (p. 6). Druss and Marcus
(2005), looking at the publication patterns of NIH R01 (basic research) grants, found that
Principal Investigators publish more than do junior investigators. This implies an
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apprentice model, in which Principal Investigators obtain funding and more junior
members share in writing the results.
The Highly Cited Research designation reported by Thomason Reuters differs
from Darby and Zucker’s (2003), who define Stars as scientists with twenty or more
discovery articles. By contrast, Thomason Reuters’ Highly Cited Researcher is defined
as being among the 250 most-cited individuals in a defined discipline for the period 1981
to 2011.
Characteristics of individuals related to their educational background are as
follows (sources: University, Vitae, Google):
•

Degree Received: PhD (0,1)

•

Degree Received: MD (0,1)

•

Degree Received: both PhD and MD (0,1)
Characteristics of individuals related to their field of research are as follows:

•

Basic Science—Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Engineering, etc. (0,1)

•

Microbiology, Molecular Biology, Biochemistry (0,1)

•

Neuroscience, Genetics (0,1)

•

Medicine, Dentistry, Nursing, Psychiatry (0,1)

•

Other—Anatomy, Public Health, etc. (0,1)

Where multiple fields are listed, I use the first department notation listed in the
NIH grant award or the department listed first in the individual’s Vita.
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Individual patent activity is represented by being listed as an inventor on a
university’s patent application during the period of 2000–2007 (source: U.S. Patent
Office). This measure is limited only to patents issued to the current university at which
the academic is located, which likely undercounts since other universities or patents
issued directly to individuals are not included. The decision to use issuance, as opposed
to application, reflects a desire to more closely link final results with NIH funding. On
average, the patent award process takes 2.77 years (Merges, Menell, and Lemley, 2010).
The period 2000 to 2007 was used to ensure adequate coverage.
Licensing and spinout activity by individuals is represented as follows (source:
University OTT):
•

Listed by the university’s OTT (or equivalent) as having licensed an
innovation or invention (0, 1).

•

Listed by the university’s OTT as being involved in a spinout (0, 1).

Due to confidentiality agreements, not all inventions are listed on OTT websites,
which can result in an undercount. OTT websites are not uniform in their display or
identification of spin outs, nor are company websites uniform in how they identify
involved university researchers.
The final individual characteristic relates to gender, a binary variable (0, 1;
sources: first names, University, Vita, and Google).
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Institutional Variables
The university-level characteristics represented in the model include the following
(sources: The Center for Measuring University Performance; National Science
Foundation; Shanghai Ranking of World Universities):
•

Number of National Academy of Arts and Sciences members at the university
in 2008.

•

The ranking of the university from which the individual received his or her
degree.

•

Public or private university (0, 1).

•

University space allocated to research and development in 2005.

•

Number of institutes listed by the university.

Environmental Variables
Environmental characteristics include the regional location of the university, a
metropolitan indicator of human capital, and the population of the metropolitan area, as
follows (source: American Community Survey):
•

Regional location—a binary variable for each of Northeast, Southeast,
Midwest, Mountain West, and Pacific (0, 1).

•

Percentage of the metropolitan population with a bachelor’s degree or higher
in 2008.

•

Metropolitan population in 2008.
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Methodological Issues
The main concern with the model’s specification is the problem of simultaneity.
As noted above, there may be a bidirectional relationship between funding and
publications. A common test for simultaneity, the Hausman Specification Test, will be
performed on the model to determine whether simultaneity is a problem. If it is, a
2-Stage Least Squares or an Indirect Least Squares method can be used to handle the
simultaneity problem.
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Chapter 3: Results

Descriptive Statistics
The sample obtained from the 24 selected universities comprises 3,092
individuals from a total population of 5,806 (53% coverage). Table 2 shows the
distribution by university. The sample coverage ranges from a low of 22.5% for the
University of Mississippi to a high of 89.5% for the University of Cincinnati. The
sample had 2,210 men (71.5%) and 883 women (28.5%). By academic rank, the sample
had 1,739 professors (56.3%), 833 associate professors (26.9%), 513 assistant professors
(16.6%), and seven of unknown rank (0.2%).
It is difficult to determine the actual representativeness of the sample regarding
academic rank. The 2011 U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States
provides a roughly comparable breakdown by gender in the life, physical, and social
sciences occupational category, with women comprising 28.7% of the three occupational
categories in this sample—biological scientists, medical scientists, and chemists and
materials scientists—in 2009.
It should be noted that comparable does not mean an exact correspondence. Other
occupational categories are included in the sample, and their presence could contribute to
undercounting. However, examining the overall internal breakdowns suggests that this
may not be a serious problem.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. The 2008 NIH Fund
Facts indicate that the total research grants awarded to the amounted to $20,375,000,000
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in 46,437 individual grants. This is an average award of $439,618. This is greater than
the sample’s average grant award of $366,100.83 (see Table 4). With respect to the other
reported independent variables, NIH award recipients in the sample clearly have higher
levels of performance in terms of articles published, citations per publication, and career
citations.
Table 4 and Graph 1 show the distribution by grant-dollar category. Forty-two
(3.2%) received two million to four million, while five (0.4%) received over four million
dollars. These skewed results, where only a few researchers obtain a very large share of
grant funds, are consistent with the findings of Zucker and Darby (2006).

52
Table 2. Sample Distribution by University.

University
Brown
Memphis
Oregon State
Rhode Island
Georgia Tech
Washington State
Wright State
Oregon
Nevada (Reno)
Mississippi
Temple
Oregon Health Science
Arizona State
Cincinnati
Missouri
Colorado Health Science Ctr
Oklahoma
Case Western Reserve
Utah
Louisville
Georgia
Portland State
Arizona
Virginia Commonwealth
Total

Population
261
117
115
83
150
155
93
143
137
151
200
413
284
171
288
24
134
398
592
279
292
84
583
659
5806

Sample
151
53
71
54
76
73
73
91
61
34
81
233
152
153
161
13
78
249
367
186
146
34
302
200
3092

Percent
57.9
45.3
61.7
65.1
50.7
47.1
78.5
63.6
44.5
22.5
40.5
56.4
53.2
89.5
55.9
54.2
58.2
62.6
62.0
66.7
50.0
40.5
51.8
30.3
53.3
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Table 3. Sample Descriptive Statistics.
Category
Total Sample
NIH Recipients
Non-NIH
Average NIH Dollars for Total
Average Dollars per NIH Recipient
Average Dollars per NIH Non-Recipient (NR)
Average 2006–07 Articles Total
Average 2006–07 Articles NIH
Average 2006–07 Articles NIH NR
Average Cites per 2006–07 Article Total
Average Cites per 2006–07 Article NIH
Average Cites per 2006–07 Article NIH NR
Average Career Cites Total
Average Career Cites NIH
Average Career Cites NIH NR
Total Number of Grants
Average Grant Award per Academic
Average Number of Grants per Academic

Statistic
3,092
1,324
1,768
$230,769
$538,927
0
3.87
5.31
2.8
1.46
2.03
1.03
430.83
637.19
275.76
1,856
$366,100.83
1.4
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Table 4. Number of Academics and Percentage by Dollar Category.

NIH Dollar Range
0
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
1,750,000
2,000,000
2,250,000
2,500,000
2,750,000
3,000,000
3,250,000
3,500,000
3,750,000
4,000,000
4,250,000
4,500,000
4,750,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
9,000,000
Total

Number of
Academics
1768
308
570
221
75
57
26
17
10
9
9
5
3
3
3
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
1
1
3092

Percent of Total
57.18
9.96
18.43
7.15
2.43
1.84
.84
.55
.32
.29
.29
.16
.10
.10
.10
.03
0
.03
0
.06
0
.03
.03
.03
.03

Table 5 shows the distribution of men and women by selected independent
variables. The percentages of each specific category are in parentheses. The data
indicate that NIH non-recipients are the majority of the sample, with similar distribution
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for women (58.5%) and for men (56.6%). With regard to performance measures, and
consistent with the results shown in Table 3, NIH non-recipients have lower performance
than do NIH recipients. The 41.5% of NIH recipients in the sample who are women is
higher than the percentage of actual awards to women in 2008 (approximately 25%; NIH
Data Book), so women may be overrepresented in this study.
While female overrepresentation may be a problem, the publication and citation
difference between NIH Recipients and NIH Non-Recipients implies that the direction or
statistical significance of the individual performance variables may not be a significant
issue. Moreover, the difference in publication rates between men and women is
consistent with that found in other studies (Evans, 2011; Hesli and Lee, 2011). That
women in the sample have lower citation rates than men is also consistent with earlier
work (Ferber, 1988).
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NIH 2008 Dollar Allocation
2000
1800
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1600
1400
1200
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600
400
200
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Figure 2
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Table 5. Distribution by Gender.
Category
Male
Total
2199 (71.7)
NIH Recipients
953 (43.4)
Non NIH Recipients
1246 (56.6)
Average Dollars for Total
$238,342
Average for NIH Recipients
$576,321
Average for NIH Non-Recipients (NR)
0
Average 2006–07 Articles Total
4.19
Average 2006–07 Articles NIH
5.71
Average 2006–07 Articles NIH NR
3.03
Average Cites per Article 2006–07 Total
1.53
Average Cites per Article 2006–07 NIH
2.17
Average Cites per Article 2006–07 NIH NR
1.04
Average Career Cites Total
469.57
Average Career Cites NIH
728.84
Average Career Cites NIH NR
318.82
Average Number of Grants
1.40
Average Dollars per Grant
$379,561.70

Female
893 (28.5)
371 (41.5)
522 (58.5
$183,992
$442,871
0
3.09
4.26
2.25
1.27
1.66
1.00
273.61
403.89
180.78
1.30
$330,536.60

Table 6 and Figure 3 show a distributional breakdown of the percentage of total
grant funds received by each gender. A greater percentage of sampled women who
received NIH awards in 2008 are in the $1–$500,000 range. They are slightly under—
6.4% versus 7.4%—in the category $500,001–$750,000, but women fall off considerably
beyond this threshold.
Table 7 compares the grant percentage distribution between genders. A higher
percentage of women than men receive awards from $1–$25,000 (28.1% versus 21.3%).
Similarly, women receive proportionately more awards in the $250,001–$500,000 range
(45.7% versus 42.1%). In all other categories, males receive proportionally more total
NIH grant dollars.
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Table 6. NIH Dollar Allocation by Gender.

NIH Dollars
0
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
1,750,000
2,000,000
2,250,000
2,500,000
2,750,000
3,000,000
3,250,000
3,500.00
3,750,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
Total

Male
1246
203
401
163
62
46
22
14
8
8
6
5
2
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
2199

%
Female
%
0.566621
522
0.584546
0.092273
104
0.116461
0.182273
169
0.18925
0.074091
58
0.06495
0.028182
14
0.015677
0.020909
11
0.012318
0.01
4
0.004479
0.006364
3
0.003359
0.003636
2
0.00224
0.003636
1
0.00112
0.002727
3
0.003359
0.002273
0
0
0.000909
1
0.00112
0.001364
0
0
0.001364
0
0
0.000455
0
0
0.000909
0
0
0.000455
1
0.00112
0.000455
0
0
0.000455
0
0
0.000455
0
0
893
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Table 8 breaks down awards by academic rank. Professors receive more NIH
money than do associate and assistant professors. Similarly, professors produce more
articles and have higher citations rates. Consistent with the trends that appear in the other
tables, NIH grant recipients produce more articles and have higher citation rates than do
NIH non-recipients.
Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 present the results by department, for academics who
have licensed an invention, for those who have spun out a company, for those who have
patented an invention, and for those who are highly cited, respectively. The number of
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academics in the sample licensing inventions, spinning out new companies, or patenting
is very small—one hundred or 3.2% for licensing, six or 0.2% for spinouts, and 162 or
5.2% for patenting. However, those who license, are involved in spinning out a
company, or who patent an invention receive higher levels of NIH grant funds and have
higher production levels than do NIH non-recipients.
Surveying 345 Highly Cited Researchers in 2008, Parker, Lortie, and Allesina
(2010) found that the average extramural funding for U.S. scientists in their survey was
$534,594, reporting that “fifty percent of respondents receive $250,000 or less each year,
and 81% receive $500,000 or less” (p. 135). Six percent of their respondents reported
receiving over $1,000,000. Their respondents’ average extramural grant total was
$387,909.
Table 13 indicates that the highly cited individuals in this study received an
average total of $927,189 with an average of $478,113 per grant. This is considerably
higher than reported by Parker, Lortie, and Allesina (2010). It is also higher than the
average amount received by all NIH recipients in this sample. The average number of
articles published in 2006–07 by highly cited researchers and the average citations per
article are also higher than the sample averages for these categories, consistent with the
findings of Zucker and Darby (2006).
The differences in publication levels and citations among departments are
consistent with other research (e.g., Adams and Griliches, 1998; Warner, Lewis, and
Gregorio, 1981). Similarly, the publication levels of individuals with licenses and spin
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outs are consistent with previous findings that academics who license an invention have
published as much or more than their peers (Thursby and Thursby, 2003).

Table 7. Total NIH Award Allocation and Percentage Compared by Gender.

Dollars
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
1,750,000
2,000,000
2,250,000
2,500,000
2,750,000
3,000,000
3,250,000
3,500,000
3,750,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
Total

Men
203
401
163
62
46
22
14
8
8
6
5
2
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
953

% of Men
21.3
42.1
17.1
6.5
4.8
2.3
1.5
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

Women
104
169
58
14
11
4
3
2
1
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
370

% of Women
28.1
45.7
15.7
3.8
3
1
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.8
0
0.2
0
0
0
0
0.2
0
0
0
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Table 8. Characteristics by Academic Rank.
Category
Professor
Total
1739
NIH
900
NIH Non-Recipients (NR) 840
Average $ NIH Total
$332,626
Average $ NIH
$643,342
Average $ NIH NR
0
Av Art 2006–07 Total
5.0
Av Art 2006–07 NIH
6.13
Av Art 2006–07 NIH NR
3.8
Av Cites 2006–07 Total
1.64
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH
2.1
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH NR
1.16
Av Career Cites Total
675.23
Av Career Cites NIH
852.99
Av Career Cites NIH NR 484.30
Average Number of Grants
1.5
Average Dollars per Grant $414,834

Associate
Assistant
Unknown
833
513
7
307
112
6
526
401
1
$119,528
$68,400
$195,008
$324,321 $313,297
$227,509
0
0
0
2.93
1.57
2.71
3.67
3.28
3.17
2.5
1.09
0
1.46
.82
.93
2.02
1.57
1.08
1.13
.61
0
151.14
56.74
791.71
190.3
142.3
923.67
128.28
33.00
0
1.19
1.17
1.0
$269,265
$244,519
$227,508

Table 9. Breakdown of Characteristics by Department.
Category Basic

Molecular

Neuroscience Medical

Economics

Other

Total
545
338
194
1124
23
869
NIH
145
187
127
546
4
318
Non NIH
400
151
67
578
19
551
Av $ Total
$117,268 $292,686 $368,592
$256,401 $65,971
$181,596
Av $ NIH
$440,764 $529,027 $567,514
$528,798 $379,336 $501,715
Non NIH
0
0
0
0
0
0
Av Art 2006–07
4.06
4.21
4.45
4.03
1.56
3.36
Av Art NIH
5.88
5.03
5.4
5.52
2.75
4.84
Av Art non NIH
3.39
3.2
2.68
2.63
1.32
2.51
Av Cites Total
1.54
1.9
2.19
1.90
.79
1.12
Av Cites NIH
2.26
2.28
2.67
2.88
.96
1.61
Av Cites Non NIH
1.28
1.44
1.3
.98
.76
.84
Av Career Total
300.69
518.08
580.13
401.17
91.3
307.48
Av Career NIH
607.91
571.41
782.38
568.22
120.38
499.26
Av Career Non NIH
188.76 452.05
205.38
244.24
85.1
195.78
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Table 10. Breakdown for License Holders.
Category
Total
NIH
NIH Non-Recipients (NR)
Av $ Total
Av $ NIH
Av $ NIH NR
Av 2006–07 Art Total
Av 2006–07 Art NIH
Av 2006–07 Art NIH NR
Av Cites 2006–07 Total
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH NR
Career Cites
Career Cites NIH
Career Cites NIH NR
Average Number of Grants
Average Dollars per Grant

100
70
30
$386,590
$552,156
0
6.6
7.5
4.5
2.48
2.84
1.64
1,136.62
1,363.79
606.57
1.6
$345,258.40

Table 11. Breakdown for Academics with Spin Out Companies.
Category
Total
NIH
NIH Non-Recipients (NR)
Av $ Total
Av $ NIH
Av $ Non NIH
Av Total 2006–07 Art
Av Total 2006–07 Art NIH
Av Total 2006–07 Art NIH NR
Av Cites 2006–07 Total
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH NR
Av Career Cites Total
Av Career Cites NIH
Av Career Cites NIH NR
Average Number of Grants
Average Dollars per Grant

6
5
1
$654,496
$785,395
0
5.33
3.40
15
0.89
0.83
1.20
406
483
18
1.00
$785,394
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Table 12. Breakdown for Academics with Patents.
Category
Total
162
NIH
97
NIH Non-Recipients (NR)
65
Av $ Total
$459,747
Av $ NIH
$767,825
Av $ NIH NR
0
Av Total 2006–07 Art
7.44
Av Total 2006–07 Art NIH
7.69
Av Total 2006–07 Art NIH NR
7.06
Av Cites 2006–07 Total
2.58
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH
3
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH NR
1.96
Av Career Cites Total
$887.98
Av Career Cites NIH
$944.34
Av Career Cites NIH NR
$803.88
Average Number of Grants
$1.60
Average Dollars per Grant
$436,110.70

65
Table 13. Breakdown for Highly Cited Academics.
Category
Total
NIH Recipients
NIH Non-Recipients (NR)
Av $ Total
Av $ NIH
Av $ NIH NR
Av 2006–07 Art Total
Av 2006–07 Art NIH
Av 2006–07 Art NIH NR
Av Cites 2006–07 Total
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH
Av Cites 2006–07 NIH NR
Av Career Cites Total
Av Career Cites NIH
Av Career Cites NIH NR
Average Number of Grants
Average Dollars per Grant

45
20
25
$412,084.00
$927,189.00
$0.00
10.76
13.60
8.48
3.61
3.84
3.96
2,618.58
4,716.55
940.20
1.85
$478,113.70

Table 14 breaks down personal and performance characteristics by the number of
grants received. Just over 69% of awardees received only one grant, and another 22.6%
received two grants. Only four (0.3%) received five grants. The fact that the number of
total articles and average and career citations increase with the number of grants received
indicates that merit plays a substantive role in the award process. At five grants, these
dynamics change, which may reflect that the number of individuals receiving this many
grants is small. Only 42.2% of the highly cited individuals received NIH grants. The
majority of the highly cited researchers (57.9%) received one NIH grant, while another
21.1% received two awards.
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Table 14. Breakdown of Characteristics by Number of Grants Received.
Number of Grants
Characteristics

1

2

3

4

5

Total

914

297

80

22

4

Men

634

226

65

19

3

Women

280

71

15

3

1

Assistant

92

18

1

0

0

Associate

254

45

7

0

0

Professor

562

234

72

22

4

Unknown

6

0

0

0

0

PhD

736

238

52

16

2

MD

120

41

17

4

2

PhD/MD

58

18

11

2

0

Basic

116

21

5

2

0

Molecular

127

41

15

3

0

Neuroscience

77

42

5

1

0

Economics

3

0

1

0

0

Med/Nurse/Dent

363

124

40

10

3

Other

288

69

14

6

1

Average Total Articles 2006–07

4.54

6.6

7.29

12.95

5.75

Average Cites 2006–07

1.89

2.18

2.96

2.41

1.23

492.03

875.22

1062.04

1869.96

1848.75

$347,909

$808,048

$1,306,246

$1,627,127

$3,231,624

11

4

2

2

0

Career Cites
Average Total NIH Dollars
Highly Cited

Table 15 and Graph 3 show grant award information by dollar category and number of
grants. A substantial majority of grants awarded were in the $250,000–$500,000 range,
with 80.5% receiving one to two grants. There are very few large multiple awards of
grants, with only four multiple awards over $2,250,000 or more. In fact, the quadrants
for three, four, and five grants at $2,500,000 and above have no awards.
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Table 15. Breakdown by Number and Size of Grants Awarded.
Grant Dollars
1
2
3
250,000
301
54
11
500,000
518
195
54
750,000
53
26
10
1,000,000
12
10
3
1,250,000
8
5
1
1,500,000
4
3
0
1,750,000
8
1
1
2,000,000
4
0
0
2,250,000
1
0
1
2,500,000
0
1
0
2,750,000
0
0
0
3,000,000
2
1
0
3,250,000
2
0
0
3,500,000
0
0
0
3,750,000
0
0
0
4,000,000
0
1
0
4,250,000
1
0
0

Number of Academics

600

4
2
13
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

NIH Funds Per Number of Grants

500
400
300

Sum of 1

200

Sum of 2
Sum of 3

100

Sum of 4

0

Sum of 5

NIH Dollars
Color is Number of Grants Received
Figure 4
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Tobit Regression
Having presented the descriptive statistics and identified the consistencies with
and differences from prior research, I turn now to the results of the Tobit Regression. I
used a Tobit Regression because there is censored data associated with those researchers
who received no NIH extramural grant funds. The Tobit regression model was run using
STATA Version 13.
Only one variable is normalized: science and engineering space. Science and
engineering space is not allocated across all faculty members in a university; instead, it is
allocated to those who are doing laboratory-related work. In this case, the science and
engineering space divided by the study population per university is used as a reasonable
approximation.
Tables 16 and 17 present the results of the Tobit models. Table 16 presents
models with total grant dollars awarded as the dependent variable. The basic iterations
are all the individual performance measures, including the rank of the university for the
terminal degree and whether or not an individual is highly cited. The second iteration
adds institutional variables, and the third iteration adds environmental variables. The
iterations demonstrate the basic stability of the coefficients of the productivity variables.
The difference between iteration three in Table 16 and the total-grant-amount
model in Table 17 is that the rank of the university for the terminal degree and highly
cited researcher were dropped as variables, while the rank of total R&D expenditures was
added. The rank of university for the terminal degree was dropped for two reasons: 1) it
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is not statistically significant; and 2) doing so increases the number of observations from
2,346 to 3,076 to use in the Tobit regression models for total grant awards, average grant
amount, and number of grants.
As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 18), the highly cited categorical
variable has a .432 correlation with career citations. Even though highly cited status is
significant at the ten percent level, it is excluded for four reasons: 1) it is a binary
variable, while career citations are an interval variable; 2) career citations are significant
at the stronger five percent level; 3) career citations covers more published work, and
therefore provides better analytics; and 4) the highly cited coefficient is perhaps
counterintuitively negative, while career citations carries a positive coefficient.
Moreover, the use of the total articles and citation per article variables alone
meaningfully limits the measure of productivity. The use of the second derivative
substantially extends the limited base—the citation range and variance. This allows better
identification of positive and negative returns. It thus compensates for the exclusion of
the highly cited dummy variable.
Given the relatively high correlation (39.1%) between total articles and career
citations, as seen in Table 18, there is the possibility of simultaneity. As noted earlier, a
common test for simultaneity is the Hausman statistic. Below are the Hausman statistics
for the three Tobit independent variables.
Total Grant Amount
χ(28) 0.60
2
Prob > χ
1.00
B = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from Tobit
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from Tobit
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Test: Ho: differences in coefficients not systematic
Average Grant Amount
χ(29) 1.76
2
1.00
Prob > χ
B = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from Tobit
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from Tobit
Test: Ho: differences in coefficients not systematic
Number of Grants
χ(29) 3.43
2
Prob > χ
1.00
B = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from Tobit
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from Tobit
Test: Ho: differences in coefficients not systematic
The statistics indicate no systematic difference in the estimates. Thus,
simultaneity is not a major problem.
Table 17 presents the results of the Tobit regression for the three dependent
variables—NIH total funds awarded, average dollars per grant, and number of grants.
Across all three regressions, the basic measures of productivity (total articles 2006–07
and average citations of articles 2006–07) are positive and statistically significant at the
0.00 probability level. Career citations is positive at the 0.00 level in the total-dollars
model and at the 0.10 level for the average-grant-dollars model, while this variable is not
statistically significant in the number-of-grants model. The second derivatives of the
total articles and average citations variables are statistically significant for each
dependent variable at either the 0.00 or 0.05 level of significance. In each instance, the
derivative is negative, which indicates decreasing returns.
In terms of the variables’ impact on the amount of total NIH dollars received in
2008, the results of the regression indicate that a key determinant is the number of articles
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published in 2006–07. These results are consistent with the findings of Ali,
Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010). The average number of citations per article
published in 2006–07 is another important determinant. Whether one is an assistant or
associate professor has a statistically significant and negative impact compared to holding
the rank of professor. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table
5, which show that professors received larger amounts of NIH grant money than do
assistant and associate professors.
In isolation, most of the institutionally related variables are estimated to have a
negative effect on the receipt of NIH funds, with two exceptions: 1) having a medical
school and 2) the university’s rank in terms of total R&D expenditure. Having a medical
school associated with the university is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the
total-dollars model, at the 0.05 level in the average-grant-dollars model, and at the 0.00
level in the number-of-grants model, consistent with the historical trend found by
Graham and Diamond (1997) and by Geiger (2008).
University rank in terms of total R&D expenditures has a negative coefficient,
which is expected given that the highest possible ranking is one. Its statistical
significance at the 0.00 level indicates that there is a halo effect associated with R&D
rank, though the coefficient is small (-$3,042.67 in the total-dollars model). The small
coefficient indicates two things. First, as a university moves up the ranking, there is only
a marginal gain for individuals based on reputation alone. Second, if the small
coefficient is any indication, it appears that for this sample of NIH-receiving universities,
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the peer-review process demonstrates little allocation bias oriented towards university
rank.
Having a medical degree has a significant effect only in the number-of-grants
model. Having both an MD and a PhD is statistically significant, as is being in a
medically related department. This likely reflects the changing nature of research in the
biomedical field, as does the statistical significance of the molecular biology and
neuroscience department dummy coefficients. However, there is a subtle aspect here.
The fact that having a dual degree is statistically significant indicates that research in the
biomedical field increasingly draws on a combination of the rigorous research designs
associated with a PhD and the advanced medical training associated with MD programs.
The correlation matrix (Table 19) highlights two subtle relationships which
underpin the broader ranking of universities by total R&D expenditures. First, there is a
.72 correlation between the rank in terms of total R&D expenditure and the number of
National Academy members at a university, which may indicate that researchers are
moving from lower- to higher-ranked institutions. Such a pattern would be consistent
with Zucker and Darby’s (2006) results for star scientists. Second, there is a strong
correlation between the number of graduate students, the number of National Academy
members (.67), and ranking in terms of total R&D expenditure (.64). While the data in
this study do not capture the differences in quality of graduate students at the included
universities, the above correlations are consistent with the findings of Zucker and
Darby (2006) and of Agrawal, McHale, and Oettle (2012) that graduate students tend to
gravitate to higher-ranked or more star-filled universities. The correlations of number of
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graduate students, number of tenured faculty, endowment, and number of National
Academy members with rank in terms of total R&D add credence to the idea that there is
a reputational halo effect, albeit a small one. These correlations also indicate that a
number of institutional variables indirectly impact the receipt of NIH funds.
The small coefficient for career citations and the negative coefficients and
statistical significance of the second derivative of articles published and citations of those
articles all demonstrate that there are diminishing returns to publications and citations in
the receipt of NIH funding.
Controlling for the effects of rank, publication, and citations, the regressions
indicate that NIH awards are not affected by a researcher’s gender. However, it should be
noted that the number of academics who receive total grant awards of $750,000 or more
is relatively small, and most are male (see Graph 2 and Tables 3 and 5).
Professorial rank plays a significant role in the receipt of NIH funds. Professors
are estimated to garner more NIH dollars. Again, even when controlling for publications
and citations, being a professor is statistically significant. As noted in Table 8, professors
have higher numbers of citations, which in turn enhances their reputation. There is also
likely a practice effect present; over their careers, professors have learned by trial and
error how to write winning grant proposals.
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Table 16. Tobit Model Total NIH Dollar Iterations.
Variables
Percentage Bachelor
Metro Pop
Number NIH Org
Basic Science
MolBiochem
NeroSciGenetics
Economics
MedNursDental
Private University
NE Region
SE Region
Middle
West
Academy Member
Land Grant
Number Institutes
Med School
Tenured Faculty 2012
Full Time Grad Std
Endowment 2008
SciEng Space per Study Pop
Rank Univ Last Degree R&D 2008
Highly Cited
Sex Female
MD degree
MD/PhD degree
Total Articles 2006–07
Articles 2006–07 Squared
Ave Cites 2006–07
Ave Cites 2006–07 Squared
Career Citation as of 2007
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor
License
Spin Out
Patent Applications 2000–07
Constant

Basic

Basic/Inst

-362.11
**-474720.1
56448.59
*234506.1
*432575
*73321.6
*-1475.46
*90701.04
*-3028.93
*42.39
*-521283.9
*-337319.5
118146.8
586308.2
117086.3
-542244.2

*-366991.2
**171414.6
*340654.1
-397804.2
59259.6
-92887.38
-31435.11
-102575.7
67895.6
-87364.94
-1373.95
-63903.28
-2469.78
**164376.7
-60.4
25.49
0
-302.55
-395.28
***-299802.2
22881.23
87035.98
*304346.5
*69873.67
*-1308.92
*73908.09
**-2467.99
**30.91
*-538194.4
*-340241.9
155027.2
***620143.4
***174291.2
-512696.8

Basic/Inst/Envirn
4978.55
*0.02
-8347.96
*-35844.8
**169707
*329594.7
-448586
51797.73
***-222145
159042.4
***-161094.6
-193251
-5146.16
***-12429.08
-50973.9
-1804.58
**144820.3
-15.67
***79.62
**0
-701.59
-353.45
***-308222
23529.82
66573.91
*295802.5
*70929.1
*-1351.96
*73524.6
**-2445.57
**33.83
*-547157
*-335241.2
178399.6
566160.1
***168065
-752921

Probability
* 0.00
**0.05
***0.10
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Table 17. Tobit Regressions by Dependent Variables.
Coefficients
Variable
Gender Female
Medical Degree
MD/Phd Degree
Total Articles 2006–07
Articles Squared*
Average Cites 2006–07
Average Cites Squared
Career
Basic Science Dept
MolBioChem
NeroSciGenetics
Economics
MedNursDental
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor
License
Spin Out
Private University
Northeast Region
Southeast Region
Middle Region
West Region
Percent Bachelors
Metro Pop 2010
Academy Members
Land Grant Univ
Number of Orgs NIH 2008
Medical School
Rank Total R&D Exp 2008
Tenured Faculty
Full Time Grad Std
Patent Application 2008
Endowment 2008
Science/Eng Sp per Pop
Constant
Number Observations
* 0.00 probability **0.05 probability

Total Grant Dollars
29455.37
-53874.47
*200969.6
*64885.47
*-1264.7
*55672.5
**-1666.69
*22.2
*-275284.3
*195686.1
*280920.2
-335984.3
*113767.4
*-523570.8
*-297491.6
***154244.7
***586712.8
-126139.3
192219.5
**-177528.1
-109074.1
26742.11
2062.4
**0.017
**-14384.16
***-137616
***-4235.4
***125037.1
**-3042.67
-71.6
13.09
***136346.4
0.000067
-911.22
-78206.03
3076
***0.10 probability

Av Grant $
31318.09
-46136.43
*135813.4
*34813.1
*-715.7
*34849.11
*-1076.75
***10.69
*-149805.7
*121022.9
*178200.5
-250113.9
**61389.92
*-326669.3
*-169672.4
***89970.81
*660607.9
110483
114404.6
-85076.05
-56160.2
60797.18
1862.35
**0.01
*-10159.35
-76816.14
**-2672.04
***68330.73
**1507.21
-52.78
25.32
40098.87
0
-565.81
-104105.2
3076

Number of Grants
0.1
*-0.28
*0.51
*0.12
*0
*0.12
*0
0
*-0.53
*0.39
*0.47
-0.54
*0.21
*-0.94
*-0.46
*0.58
0.46
-0.2
***0.36
*-0.38
-0.29
-0.03
0.01
*0
*-0.03
**-0.36
**-0.01
*0.31
**-0.01
0
0
0.11
0
0
0.12
3076
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Table 18. Correlation Matrix for Selected Individual Productivity Variables.

Variable
NIH Funds
2008
Total Articles
2006–07
Average Cites
2006–07

NIH Funds
2008

Articles
2006–07

Average
Cites

Career
Cites

Highly
Cited

Number
Grants

Grant
Dollars

1
0.2954

1

0.1489

0.2421

1

Career Cites

0.1859

0.3913

0.2052

1

Highly Cited
Number of
Grants
Average Grant
Dollars

0.0452

0.1776

0.0996

0.432

1

0.71

0.3187

0.187

0.1501

0.0321

1

0.8648

0.2472

0.1352

0.1553

0.0235

0.5669

1

Table 19. Correlation Matrix for Institutional Characteristics with Normalized Variables.
Rank

NIH

Academy

Faculty

Rank Total 2008

1

NIH Fund 2008

-0.0809

1

Academy Members

-0.7216

0.0131

1

Tenured Faculty 2012
Full Time Graduate
Students

-0.216

-0.0513

0.2333

1

-0.6373

0.0049

0.6690

0.1465

Endowment

-0.2557

0.0935

0.2290

0.1232

EngSpace per Pop

-0.0281

-0.0319

0.0467

0.1170

Studen
t

Endo
w

EngSp
c

1
0.2906
0.0124

1
0.011
5

1

Another factor that impacts the receipt of NIH funds is the individual’s specific
field of study. While the categories used in this study are broad, there is clearly an
orientation of NIH funding toward specific fields, even though the productivity levels are
similar in terms of articles published and average number of citations. Basic science
(biology, chemistry, physics, etc.), for instance, has a negative coefficient, which is
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statistically significant at the 0.00 level across all models. Molecular biology and
microbiology, neuroscience, genetics, and medical/nursing/dental departments have
positive and statistically significant coefficients, which is also consistent with the
findings of Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010).
The region in which a university is located generally has no effect on the amount
of NIH funds received, except for the Southeast region, the presence in which has a
negative and significant impact at the 0.05 level. However, further study would be
needed to determine the extent to which this relationship holds across a broader selection
of geographically distributed universities. Whether a university is private or public has
no significant consequence in any of the regression models, which differs from the
findings of Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010) that public universities receive
fewer federal grant dollars than do private universities. They may have found such a
difference because they include a broader range of federal funding sources than the NIH
dollars used here.
A land grant designation is negative and significant at the 0.10 level for the totalNIH-dollars model and significant at the 0.05 level for the average-grant-dollars and the
number-of-grants models. This may reflect the fact that land grant institutions have
historically had greater access to other federal funds, such as those provided by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Variables associated with the percentage of metropolitan residents with bachelor
degrees, the number of university institutes, the number of tenured faculty, and the
number of full-time graduate students is estimated to have no significant impact on the
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receipt of NIH funds. Endowment size also had no significant impact in any of the
estimated models, inconsistent with the view that endowments help facilitate grant
applications (Cole, 2009; Rose, 1986). However, endowments, while often allocated to
departments, are frequently subject to specific restrictions, which may limit their impact
(Lapovsky, 2009). Further, since the universities in this study do not represent any
beyond the top 20 NIH recipients. The impact of endowments may be significant when
universities in the top 20 NIH recipients are considered.
A puzzling result is the negative coefficient associated with Science and
Engineering Space. Although not at a significant level, the negative coefficient is
inconsistent with the findings of Bania et al. (1991).
Across all models, the direction of the coefficient associated with number of
members of the National Academy does not change, indicating that the presence of
National Academy members does not have a positive spillover effect on individual
researcher’s success in obtaining NIH awards. The fact that being in the highly cited
category has a negative coefficient and significant impact at the ten percent level and the
finding that the career-citations variable has a small coefficient provide further indication
that spillover effects are limited.
Three external variables have significant effects on NIH awards: 1) metropolitan
population; 2) the number of organizations in the metropolitan area receiving NIH funds;
and 3) rank in terms of total R&D expenditures. The size of the urban area matters,
possibly indicating a contribution of agglomeration economies. However, the number of
organizations in the metropolitan area competing for NIH funds also is estimated to have
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a mitigating effect on such economies of agglomeration. The estimated negative effect
associated with the rank of total R&D expenditures is as expected; its inverse relationship
with NIH dollars received suggests that there is a halo effect associated with reputation.
Turning to the economic impact of the independent variables for Total NIH funds,
funding is clearly a complex process. Citations of recent articles are estimated to add
about $55,000 per citation to NIH awards. Having both a PhD and an MD contributes an
estimated $201,000 per award. Specializing in molecular biology, biochemistry, or
microbiology contributes $196,000, while a focus on neuroscience and genetics
contributes $281,000. When an individual has licensed an invention or has been involved
in a spinout, the estimated effects on NIH awards are $154,900 and $587,000,
respectively. Considering that the average NIH recipient receives a total amount of
$538,927 and an average per-grant amount of $366,100, the effects of these variables
clearly become very important.
Table 20 and Graph 4 show the predicted total NIH funds by number of articles,
along with the number of academics in the sample who published each number of
articles. The prediction is based on the derivative of the regression equation with respect
to the number of publications. Clearly, there are decreasing marginal returns for greater
numbers of published articles.
Holding other funding determinants constant, if an academic wanted to receive a
modest additional amount of NIH funds, he or she must publish at least two articles. If
an academic sought to be in the middle of the pack (45.2%), he or she must have four
publications over the previous two years, which would garner an estimated additional
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$122,180. If an individual wanted to break out of the pack, he or she would on average
have five or six publications over the prior two-year period, which would place the
person in the 64% to 72% range, garnering an estimated additional $286,475 to $336,180,
respectively. This amount can be compared with the average total grant amount of
$515,927.
These estimates indicate that in order to receive NIH grant dollars, a researcher
must publish. The positive statistical relationship between publication performance and
total NIH grant funds indicates that there is an implicit normative performance standard
used to allocate NIH grant dollars.
Table 21 and Graph 5 present the estimated average grant award per article, again
showing diminishing returns. These diminishing returns, when combined with the results
of Parolo et al. (2015), make it clear that publications and citations have a short shelf life,
which affects the amount of NIH funding received in that the concept of “contribution to
the field” increasingly requires that the work an academic produces be current.
Table 22 and Graph 6 show the predicted total NIH dollars by average citations
per published article, along with the number of academics receiving each rate of citation.
Table 23 and Graph 7 show the predicted average NIH grant dollars in the same terms.
As with the number of articles published, the results indicate diminishing marginal
returns.
Comparison of the coefficients across the models indicates a fair degree of
consistency and stability. Succinctly summarized, the models indicate that individual
scholarly performance is a key determinant in obtaining NIH extramural grants.
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Specifically, the number of articles published in the prior two years is an important
determinant of successfully receiving a grant.
In this study, 68% of those receiving NIH funds fell in the range of one-to-four
citations per article. Eight percent had between five and eight citations per article, and
only six (0.005%) had seventeen or more citations per article. The skewed nature of the
estimated citation effect is similar to that found by Redner (2005). Because the citations
considered here are only associated with articles published in 2006 and 2007, the number
of citations is relatively small in 2006 and becomes larger in 2007 as the articles became
more widely reviewed. While an article may be cited for many reasons, average citations
within the first two years of publication may be seen to represent at least two factors.
The first is a reputational effect. The greater one’s reputation, the sooner peers tend to
read and cite the article. The second is the impact of a breakthrough article, as
breakthroughs often become known to the field in advance and are reviewed and
published more quickly.
Because the skewed nature of the NIH dollars disbursed might substantively
impact the basic model, I ran an additional Tobit regression excluding those fourteen
academics, one of whom is Highly Cited, who received more than $3 million. I also ran a
regression with a National Academy Member interactive variable in order to determine if
there was a spillover effect between the number of academy members at a university and
academic rank. The interactive variable was the product of the number of academy
members at the university and the value of the individual’s rank: 0 = Unknown,

82
1 = Assistant, 2 = Associate, and 3 = Professor. The results of these two regressions are
presented in Tables A and B, respectively, in Appendix A.
Eliminating the outliers had minimal impact. Having a Medical Degree changes
from negative but not statistically significant, to negative and statistically significant at
the 0.05 level of probability. Patent Applications become non-significant, though the
coefficients of the variables also shift. The most noticeable shifts are in Total Articles,
which change from $64,885.47 to $51,465.32, and Average Citations, which drop from
$55,672.5 to $42,919.48.
For the regression including the interactive variable, the results found that the
interactive variable had a value of -5,762.67 and was significant at the 0.05 level of
probability. No significant change in the probability levels of the other variables
occurred. Further, the changes in the coefficients are modest. For instance, Total
Articles moved from $64,885.47 to $65,061.52, while Average Citations moved from
55,672.56 to 55,863.86.
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Table 20. Diminishing Marginal Return for Total NIH Grants to Publications.
Article
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
34
53

Total Dollars
0
62,355
59,825
57,295
54,765
52,235
49,705
47,175
44,645
42,115
39,585
37,055
34,525
31,995
29,465
26,935
24,405
21,875
19,345
16,185
11,755
9,225
4,165
1,635
-895
-3,425
-5,955
-8,485
-11,015
-13,545
-16,075
-21,135
-69,205

Number of Academics
92
179
185
141
139
116
98
71
55
43
33
29
26
21
12
14
11
8
9
11
4
3
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2

Percentage
0.069856
0.135915
0.140471
0.107062
0.105543
0.088079
0.074412
0.05391
0.041762
0.03265
0.025057
0.02202
0.019742
0.015945
0.009112
0.01063
0.008352
0.006074
0.006834
0.008352
0.003037
0.002278
0.000759
0.001519
0.000759
0.000759
0.000759
0.001519
0.001519
0.001519
0.001519
0.000759
0.001519
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Table 21. Diminishing Marginal Return for Average NIH Grant to Publications.
Articles
Academics Est Average Grants
0
92
0
1
179
32,695.61
2
185
30,542.11
3
141
28,388.61
4
139
26,235.11
5
116
24,081.61
6
98
21,928.11
7
71
19,774.61
8
55
17,621.11
9
43
15,467.61
10
33
13,314.11
11
29
11,160.61
12
26
9,007.11
13
21
6,853.61
14
12
4,700.11
15
14
2,546.61
16
11
393.11
17
8
-1,760.39
18
9
-3,913.89
19
11
-6,067.39
21
4
-10,374.40
22
3
-12,527.90
24
1
-16,834.90
25
2
-18,988.40
26
1
-21,141.90
27
1
-23,295.40
28
1
-25,448.90
29
2
-27,602.40
30
2
-29,755.90
31
2
-31,909.40
32
2
-34,062.90
34
1
-38,369.90
53
2
-79,286.40
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Table 22.Diminishing Marginal Returns to Citations in Terms
of Total NIH Grants.
Average NIH
Articles Academics
Grant
0
267
0
1
349 33,818.77
2
270 32,537.36
3
176 31,112.22
4
107 29,726.21
5
63 28,211.39
6
19 26,914.79
7
20 25,245.62
8
9 24,095.09
9
9 22,563.50
10
9 20,744.48
11
6 19,353.98
12
1 17,636.30
13
4 16,562.75
14
1 16,004.50
15
5 13,820.19
16
3 12,321.03
17
1 10,479.30
20
1
6,185.10
26
1
-2,403.30
27
1
-3,834.70
28
1
-5,266.10
38
1
-19,580
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Table 23. Diminishing Marginal Returns for Average NIH Grant to Citations.
Number of Citations
Number of Academics
Average NIH Grant
0
267
0
1
349
33,353.50
2
270
31,425.65
3
176
29,281.57
4
107
27,196.36
5
63
24,917.36
6
19
22,966.65
7
20
20,455.45
8
9
18,724.51
9
9
16,420.27
10
9
13,885.12
11
6
11,591.64
13
4
7,393.32
17
1
-1,760.06
20
1
-8,220.56
27
1
-23,295.10
38
1
-46,983.60
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Let us turn now to the research questions.
Research Questions
1. Do Highly Cited Researchers receive significantly more NIH funding than do
others?
The answer to this question is both clear and nuanced. The descriptive statistics
show that highly cited NIH recipients on average receive $927,189 compared to $538,927
for the entire sample. Similarly, the average total publications over 2006–07 for highly
cited NIH recipients is 13.6, compared to an average of 5.31 for the entire NIH recipient
sample. Thus, consistent with other studies, highly cited academics are more productive
and on average receive more NIH funds than others do.
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Of the forty-five highly cited academics in this study, nineteen (42.2%) received
NIH grants. Of those receiving NIH extramural grants, 57.9% received one grant, and
another 21% received two grants. Of the remaining four, two received three grants and
two received four grants.
However, the Tobit results indicate that, while the highly cited variable is
statistically significant at the ten percent level, the negative coefficient actually reduces
the amount of Total NIH Grant funds by $308,222. The Tobit results also indicate that
the number of career citations—which represent the reputation of the highly cited
academics—while having a positive coefficient and statistical significance at the ten
percent level, has a small $22.2 coefficient for total grant funds. The negative coefficient
for the second derivative for articles published from 2006–07 and their associated
citations indicates that for these key performance indicators there are diminishing returns
for both total grant and average grant funds, consistent with the findings of Adams and
Griliches (1998) and of Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak (2010).
The perishability of articles and citations (Parolo et al., 2015, Pollman, 2000;
Redner, 2005), combined with the diminishing marginal returns and small coefficient for
the number of career citations, indicates that current publications and citations are more
important than past performance. In the highly competitive environment for NIH grant
funding—only 28% of the applicants received NIH funds in 2008—the idea of publish or
perish is not far from the economic truth, as indicated by these results. Moreover, there is
a positive and reinforcing association between ongoing publication and government
funding (McAllister and Condon, 1985; Pagel and Hudetz, 2011a; Pagel and Hudetz,
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2011b; Pao, 1991). NIH funding increases the number of publications by one additional
article over a five-year period (Jacob and Lefgren, 2007). With an estimated time lag of
about three years between NIH funding and publication (Boyack and Jordan, 2011), any
disruption in the receipt of NIH funds could negatively impact publication and the
subsequent receipt of NIH funds.
Recurrent funding is therefore important for sustaining focused research and
publication. The results of this study indicate that endowments, after controlling for such
factors as number of articles, their citations, gender, and number of career citations, do
not effect the receipt of NIH extramural grant funds to any statistically significant extent.
Yet better-funded universities may have the capability to provide recurrent funding
(Landel, 2010), which could reflect the negative coefficient. Further, highly cited
academics may also have access to non-NIH funds. Barring these, continued
“contribution to the field” requires a strong current record of publication. Depending on
one’s past publication history and citation record, the criteria required for the designation
of “Highly Cited” may be insufficient.
2. Does the number of members of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences at a
university positively contribute to NIH funding? (Is there a faculty-level halo
effect?)
Regardless of model or dependent variable, this coefficient is negative and statistically
significant at the 0.05 or 0.00 level of probability. This association probably reflects two
conditions. First, the total number of Academy Members at a university reflects
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members in all fields. Academics in many of these fields, exemplified by the Economics
Department in this study, generally neither seek nor receive significant amounts of NIH
funds. Second, highly cited Academy Members—the stars—may have access, because of
their reputations, to funds other than from the NIH (Campbell, Koski, and Blumenthal,
2004; Lendel, 2010).
3. Does having a degree from a top-ranked university contribute positively to the
amount of NIH funding received?
There is no statistically significant relationship here. There has been criticism
that the NIH review panels steer money to universities with which they are somehow
affiliated (Rose, 1965). This research suggests that NIH funds appear not to be allocated
based on the university from which an academic graduated. Further, the small Total
R&D Expenditures coefficient, at least up to the top twenty institutions ranked by R&D
spending, indicates that any allocation bias is minimal.
4. Does the number of articles published in the two years immediately preceding the
receipt of NIH funds have a positive impact on the level of NIH funding?
The Tobit model indicates that the number of articles published in the immediate
two years prior to the receipt of NIH extramural grant funds has a positive and
statistically significant impact on the amount of funding at the 0.00 level of probability.
For the total amount of NIH grants received, the number of articles in the prior two years
contributes $64,885.47, contributing $34,813.10 to the average grant award. However, as
indicated by the negative coefficients for the second derivative of the estimated total
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grant award and average grant amounts attributed to the number of articles in the two
years prior, there are diminishing marginal returns.
5. Does the average number of citations per recent publication positively impact the
level of NIH funding?
For the immediate two years preceding the application for an NIH grant, the
number of citations has a positive and statistically significant impact on receipt of such
funds at the 0.00 probability level. The number of career citations has a statistically
significant but small impact. However, the second derivative of the average number of
citations has a negative coefficient. This and the estimated marginal returns for total
grant and average grants per citations indicate that there are diminishing returns to the
number of citations.
6. Is there a difference in publication performance between NIH recipients and nonrecipients?
The data show a consistently lower publication rate for those academics who do
not receive NIH funds. This pattern holds regardless of gender, academic position, or
department. NIH non-recipients published on average 2.8 articles in the two years prior
to 2008, while NIH recipients published on average 5.3. This trend is similar for
citations.
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7. Do academics who license an innovation/invention through the university’s
Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) receive more NIH funding than other
recipients?
Only 3.2% of the sample has licensed an invention. Comparatively, NIH
recipients who licensed an invention averaged $566,864 in total grant funds, compared to
the average of $515,927 for the sample. When controlling for articles published, average
citations, career citations, departments, and rank, the licensing of technology contributes
positively and is statistically significant at the 0.10 level for total grant and average grant
and at the 0.00 level for number of grants. The licensing of an invention contributes
$154,244.70 to the total grant amount.
8. Do academics who are part of a spinout receive more NIH funding than do other
recipients?
A very small number of academics in this sample (0.2%) have been involved in a
spinout. However, being involved in spinning out a business contributes positively to the
receipt of total NIH funds. The coefficient for spinning out a business is the highest of all
the variables at $586,712 with a probability level of 0.10. Comparatively, those
recipients who spun out a company average $785,395, while the sample average is
$515,927. Spinning out a small business has a positive and statistically significant
impact on average dollars per grant at the 0.05 level.
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9. Does being listed as an inventor on a university’s patent application positively
contribute positively to the receipt of NIH funding?
One hundred and sixty-two academics in the sample (5.2%) have received a
patent for an invention. Patenting an invention does have a statistically significant impact
on the total receipt of NIH grants at the 0.10 level. It has no statistical impact on the
average grant amount. It must be noted that the data here are restricted to those
academics who are cited as an inventor in patents submitted by their university and do
not include patents submitted in their own names or by other organizations. The results
reflect this constricted approach.
Given the problems with the data, a firm conclusion as to whether the probability
level for Patents, Licenses, and Spinouts would increase or decrease with better data
would require additional research. Nonetheless, the positive association and statistical
significance of all three variables may be a consequence of the three factors noted in the
literature review. The first is the growing impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, which
encourages universities to license and patent inventions. Mowery et al. (2004) noted a
substantial increase in university patenting following the passage of the Act. The second
factor is current academics—attracted by the possibility of substantive remuneration, as
exemplified by the wealth garnered by the academic founders of the early biotechnology
firms (Hughes, 2011; Robbins-Roth, 2000)—may now be licensing and patenting more
of their research results. Aldridge and Audretsch (2010) noted such a trend for scientists
receiving grants from the National Cancer Institute. Finally, the culture within
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departments may contribute to individuals’ decisions to license or patent (Bercovitz and
Feldman, 2008). Taken together, these three factors suggest that a cultural shift may be
occurring in the normative behavior of scientists toward a more entrepreneurial and
commercial-oriented attitude to research. Such a shift may impact where research efforts
are directed, which may, in turn, contribute to the departmental effects shown here in the
Tobit models.

Policy Implications
The tapestry woven by this study presents a clear picture of the importance of
individual academic performance. The picture is more complex with regards to highly
cited academics, as the Tobit models indicate that being highly cited does not guarantee
increasing returns. Likewise, career citations have only a small statistically significant
impact. In addition, the negative coefficients of the second derivatives of both articles
published in 2006–07 and their associated citations indicate diminishing marginal returns.
These are, of course, the key measures of the highly cited academic’s performance. The
descriptive statistics, on the other hand, indicate that highly cited academics receive more
NIH funds and are more productive.
The complexity and its subtle impact on policy is reflected in the interactions
between a number of variables. The number of academy members is positively
associated with university ranking in terms of total research and development
expenditure. More academy members are also positively correlated with the size of a
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university’s endowment. When considering the fact that the presence of stars in a
department generally increases the number of publications (Agrawal, McHale, and
Oettle, 2012), there appears to be a subtle halo effect.
Agrawal, McHale, and Oettle (2012), in their study of a star’s impact on
Evolutionary Biology Departments, concluded: “Our findings suggest that starrecruitment strategies may be most effective where a cadre of related incumbents is
already present and the organization has a flow of new hiring slots sufficient to take
advantage of the improved quality of potential new recruits” (p. 20). This research
suggests that while that hiring strategy may be valid, how institutions define stars and on
which departments they focus their recruitment efforts may be equally important.
An observation regarding Yale’s improvement in patenting and spinning out
companies is telling, echoing Cole’s (2009) statement regarding absolute advantage: “As
a private university, Yale can offer competitive salaries to senior employees recruited
from industry” (Breznitz, 2014, p. 71). The ability of top-ranked universities, such as
Yale, to pay “competitive salaries” for the talent they desire is enhanced by the resources
of their large endowments. This makes it difficult for lower-ranked universities to
compete for talent. When combined with the trend noted by Zucker and Darby (2006),
lower-ranked universities may be at an absolute disadvantage. This returns us to the
question Rhode (2006) raised: “Is it worth it?”
The answer to that question depends on the policy objective. However, if one
assumes that lower-ranked universities must pay a premium above what the elite
universities would be willing to pay—and perhaps the lower rank, the larger the
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premium—this work indicates that the idea of a positive return on that investment may be
problematic in such a circumstance.
While this study focused on the year 2008, in order to determine if academics
who moved from one university to another had maintained contracts with NIH after the
move, I made a cursory examination. The examples come from curricula vitae listed by
ISI Thomason Reuters Highly Cited Academics and other academics’ curricula vitae.
The results are presented in Appendix B, Table A. Based on this very cursory review of
nine academics, seven of whom are highly cited, two things become clear. First, NIH
contracts are maintained, often with an increase in the amount received. Second,
consistent with the findings of Zucker and Darby (1996), there is a tendency to move
from a lower-ranked university to one of higher rank. There are four exceptions: Ronald
Kessler, Paul Watkins, Michael Levine, and Joseph Beckman. Most relevant is Joseph
Beckman, who moved from the University of Alabama to Oregon State University.
When he left the University of Alabama, his peak grant was $844,550. After several
years at Oregon State University, his largest grant amount was $1,353,927. While not
systematic, these examples indicate that obtaining a Highly Cited Academic could result
in higher levels of NIH funds for his or her new university.
However, given the diminishing marginal returns to publications and citations, the
small career-citation coefficients, and the negative coefficient for the highly cited
categorical variable, when universities recruit a star, they must make sure that the star is
on top of his or her game, both in terms of current publications and receipt of NIH funds.
If he or she is current, obtaining higher-than-average returns seems likely. Merely having
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a title contributes little and may even hurt the university’s attempt to move up in
rankings.
The work of Bania et al. (1991) and the development of Stanford add additional
refinement to the picture. Universities move up in rankings by being competitive in a
specific field, as opposed to trying to identify the right mix of fields. The statistical
significance of various departmental groupings strengthens this idea of focusing on
specific departments.
Equally helpful may be the development of an entrepreneurial atmosphere in the
focus department and at the university. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) found that the
culture within a department—and particularly the attitude of the Department Head—
increases the licensing activity of academics in that department.
Yale’s experience in strengthening its OTT staff and streamlining processes in
order to increase licensing and spinouts provides another focal point. This in turn can
have a substantive impact on the receipt of NIH dollars, on local economic development
activities, and on the creation of a constructive advantage.
Unlike the findings of Bania et al. (1991), however, this study indicates that the
amount of Science and Engineering Space has a small but statistically insignificant and
negative coefficient. Thus, rapidly expanding the amount of Science and Engineering
space may not lead to the receipt of additional NIH funds.
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Summary
This study concerned 3,092 academics at twenty-four universities drawn from
those in the top twenty and below in terms of receipt of NIH funds. Universities in these
categories are considered to be the most volatile. Thus, the examination here of the
performance of individual academics, institutional characteristics, and external factors
may help inform what contributes the most to the receipt of NIH funds. The 3,092
academics represent 53.3% of the study population. Non-recipients of NIH funding
comprise the majority of the sample. The distribution of non-recipients is similar for
women, 58.5%, and for men, 56.6%. With regards to performance measures, nonrecipients of NIH grants have lower performance than recipients have.
A key determinant of the receipt of NIH funds is individual performance, as
measured by the number of articles published and average citations per article in the two
years immediately prior to the grant application. To the extent that these criteria
represent the quality of the research proposal, allocation of NIH funds is based on merit.
Professors receive more NIH money than do associates and assistant professors.
Similarly, professors produce more articles and have higher citation rates. Consistent
with the findings throughout this study, on average, NIH recipients produce more articles
and have higher citation rates than do non-recipients of NIH funds, regardless of rank.
The data indicate that being highly cited alone does not contribute to an increase
in NIH funding; there is a positive but small coefficient associated with number of career
citations.
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The second derivative of articles published in 2006–07 and average citations per
article is negative and statistically significant at the 0.00 probability level. Taken
together, these results, along with the estimated decreasing marginal returns, indicate that
there are decreasing returns for common academic productivity measures with regards to
the receipt of NIH grant funds.
The specific field of an academic also impacts the receipt of NIH funds. While
the categories used in this study are broad, the bias toward specific fields is clear even
though productivity levels are similar. This bias may reflect a changing emphasis in
biotechnology research.
Licensing technology contributes positively to the receipt of NIH funds. Being
involved in spinning out a business, patenting an invention, and licensing an invention
also all contribute positively to the receipt of NIH funds. These relationships and the
departmental bias support the notion that there is an increasing emphasis on
commercialization in biotechnology research.
The data show complex interactions. Individual performance is a key determinant
to obtaining NIH funding, as are an academic’s rank and field. Gender is not an
important factor. While some institutional and environmental variables also contribute to
the obtaining of NIH funds, they are secondary to individual effort.
There is an expiration date, however, on the results of individual efforts. This
puts pressure on the academic who wants to receive NIH funds to continually produce.
In the highly competitive biotechnology grant environment, where only 28% of
applicants successfully received NIH Research Grants in 2008, publish or perish has a
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very significant and specific meaning. In the past, academics published copiously in the
early periods of their careers. As they aged, however, their publication rates declined. In
the biotechnology fields, however, increasing commercialization and increasingly
entrepreneurial attitudes towards research may be changing this pattern. With a short
shelf life for publications and citations and the positive associations of licensing,
patenting, and spinouts with NIH grants, publication must be continuous and commercial
activities must be regularly pursued. Combining these processes with the shifting
research emphasis in specific departments may be creating a new group of stars.
The definition of these new stars reflects that of Darby and Zucker (2006) in
terms of impact, articles, citations, grant dollars received, inventions licensed, patents
received, and involvement in spin outs. It differs in terms of the current, up-to-date
nature demanded of academic production. For universities seeking to move up the
Carnegie Ladder, the difference in emphasis might be conceptualized as the difference
between obtaining a single home-run hitter and obtaining several academics who
consistently hit doubles and triples. While home-run hitters may capture a lot of
attention, the latter are in fact the Money Ball Players.
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Table A
Tobit Regression Without Outliers (Over 3 Million Total Grant Dollars)
Variable
Gender Female
Meddegree
Degree MDPhD
Total Art 200607
ArtSqd
AverCites 200607
AvCites Sqd
Career Cites 2007
DeptBasic Sci
Molbiochemmicro
NeroSciGenetics
EconDept
MedNursingDent
AsstProf
AssocProf
Liscenses
Spinout
PrivateUniv
RegNE
RegSE
RegMiddle
RegWest
PerBachelor
MetroPop2010
AcademyMembers
LandGrant
Number OrgNIH2008
NumberInst
MedSch
RankTotRDExp2008
TenFaculty2012
FullTimeGradStd
PatentApplication200207
Endowment2008
SciEngSpaceperStudyPop
Constant
Number of Observations
Confidence Level

Coefficient
31536.76
*-128824.4
*187085.2
*51465.32
*-1005.43
*42919.4
*-1312.98
11.8
*-249879.6
**115908.7
*195548
***-295035.8
**78501.72
*-437184.4
*-248712.8
*189289
**573371.1
-126794.2
155655.4
**-145543.6
-103224.1
27655.21
2826.72
**.014
*-13062.02
**-152950.9
***-2952.82
2206
**93043.24
**-2692.58
-67.07
11.94
61593.37
0
-720.13
39082.69
3064
*0.00

t-statistic
1.08
-3.08
3.11
9.8
-5.39
4.65
-3.05
1.45
-5.78
2.6
3.61
-1.63
2.31
-10.18
-8.01
2.8
2.24
-1.44
1.63
-2.49
-1.09
0.31
1.11
2.53
-2.78
-2.46
-1.66
0.42
1.94
-2.31
-1.47
0.27
1.08
0.93
-1.36
-1.36
**0.05

***0.10

Table B
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Tobit Regression with Interactive Number of Academy Members Variable.
Variable
Gender Female
Meddegree
Degree MDPhD
Total Art 200607
ArtSqd
AverCites 200607
AvCites Sqd
Career Cites 2007
DeptBasic Sci
Molbiochemmicro
NeroSciGenetics
EconDept
MedNursingDent
AsstProf
AssocProf
Liscenses
Spinout
PrivateUniv
RegNE
RegSE
RegMiddle
RegWest
PerBachelor
MetroPop2010
AcademyMembers
InterAcadRank
LandGrant
Number OrgNIH2008
NumberInst
MedSch
RankTotRDExp2008
TenFaculty2012
FullTimeGradStd
PatentApplication200207
Endowment2008
SciEngSpaceperStudyPop
Constant
Number of Observations
Confidence Level
*0.00

Coefficient
29343.1
-53196.63
**195957.4
*65061.52
*-1279.54
*55863.86
*-1668.3
**23.94
*-276750.2
*194804.2
*275655.7
-335734.3
**11300.7
*-660416.7
*-360323.3
***152683.6
***576023.8
-121537.7
190536.7
**-155228.8
-91482.62
46832.62
1404.88
**0.0167
-1488.01
**-5762.67
**-137154
-3496.57
4472.7
**121760.7
**-3179.05
-71.66
16.88
***138372.1
0
-857.14
-22682.76
3078
**0.05

t-statistic
0.78
-1
2.52
9.64
-5.34
4.72
-3.03
2.32
-4.94
3.39
3.95
-1.43
2.56
-7.89
-7.31
1.75
1.75
-1.07
1.54
-2.04
-0.74
0.41
0.43
2.36
-0.17
-2.21
-1.71
-1.49
0.66
1.96
-2.12
-1.22
0.29
1.91
0.54
-1.25
-0.07

***0.10
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Table A
Movement of Academics and Receipt of NIH Funds
Name
David H.
Ledbetter

Position
Professor

Field

University

Molecular
Biology/
Genetics

U of Chicago
(48)

Highly Cited

Emory (35)

Ronald C
Kessler

Professor

Neuroscience

U of Michigan
(10)

Highly Cited

Harvard (33)

Susan G
Anara

Professor

Neuroscience

OR Hlth Sci
Ctr (64)

Highly Cited

U of
Pittsburgh
(22)

Joseph S
Beckman

Professor

Biology/
Biochemistry

U of Alabama
(38)

Highly Cited

OR State Univ
(63)

Paul B
Watkins

Assoc/Prof

Pharmacology

U of Michigan
(10)

Highly Cited

U of NC
Chapel Hill
(19)

Year
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

305989

313049

501403

501413

0

2005

2006

405139

407488

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1325935

1254650

1501001

1887701

282072

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

717438

1307320

6298503

7196239

5433952

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

323265

280209

285218

547015

195984

2004

2005

2006

410135

416090

205661

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

246298

629317

563967

844550

151479

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

459785

1833390

1636927

1353927

1353927

1995

1996

1997

1998

309560

317503

274547

389924

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

378050

386889

395992

621537

1173729
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Michael
Levine

Professor

Biology/
Genetics

U of San
Diego (6)

Highly Cited

U of Berkeley
(17)

Wen-Hwa
Lee

Professor

Molecular
Biology/
Genetics

U TX HSC
(83)

Highly Cited

U CA Irvine
(62)

Patricia D
Hurn

Professor

OR Hlth Sci U
(64)

U TX Austin
(32)

Susan
Hickman

Assistant

Associate

OR Hlth Sci U
(64)

Indiana U (37)

1995

1996

238787

223937

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

232755

406370

745509

829766

1005722

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

566565

587511

599445

583086

613346

2001

2002

2003

2004

2006

270825

1764156

1375067

683008

304375

2008

2009

2010

2120312

1824591

202736

2011

2012

2013

322208

370951

352649

2008

2009

2010

192500

231000

502736

2011

2012

2013

322208

307923

352649

